Abdullah Tırpan’s Death Was Preventable: Those Responsible Must Be Held to Account

World Human Rights Defenders – Berlin | Press Statement | 26 October 2026

Abdullah Tırpan, 73, died around midday on 26 October 2026 in the intensive care unit of Başakşehir Çam and Sakura City Hospital in Istanbul. He was a gravely ill prisoner: his leg had been amputated three days before his death, and he had lost the ability to speak months earlier. His family, members of parliament and human rights organisations had warned for months that he could die in prison. Not one of those warnings was heeded.

We extend our heartfelt condolences to the family, friends and loved ones of Abdullah Tırpan, and we share their grief.

Who was he?

Abdullah Tırpan was born in 1953. He spent most of his life working in Tekirdağ, where he ran a köfte and sucuk business and a butcher’s shop with his family. In the mass prosecutions that followed the 2016 coup attempt, he was detained on 16 August 2016 and held in pre-trial detention for 19 months. The Tekirdağ 3rd High Criminal Court sentenced him to 7 years and 6 months in prison.

The grounds for his conviction were: an account at Bank Asya, newspaper and magazine subscriptions, sending his children to schools that were operating legally at the time, and donations to charities. None of these acts was a crime when it was committed. In his defence, Tırpan stated that he had never been a member of any illegal organisation. After the Court of Cassation upheld the verdict, he was returned to prison in February 2025. Exactly twenty months later, he died in the custody of the state.

The Chain of Decisions That Led to His Death

Abdullah Tırpan’s death was not a sudden misfortune. It was the outcome of a process that could have been stopped again and again.

1. Imprisonment despite grave illness: A 72-year-old man with advanced diabetes, hypertension, nerve damage, impaired vision and non-healing wounds on his feet was sent back to prison in February 2025.

2. Forty trips to hospital, forty returns to his cell: During his imprisonment he was taken to hospital or the prison infirmary around forty times, and each time he was sent back to his ward. On 3 November 2025 he lost consciousness in his cell. He was taken to the emergency room and returned to prison once again. When he was taken back for breathlessness and constant vomiting, he was not even kept for observation.

3. The Forensic Medicine Institution’s “fit to stay” reports: On 17 December 2025 the Forensic Medicine Institution (Adli Tıp Kurumu) ruled that Tırpan could remain in prison. In May and June 2026, hospital health boards in Tekirdağ reached the same conclusion. These reports listed his serious illnesses one by one, yet saw no need to defer his sentence. As the human rights group Mazlum-Der pointed out, declaring a man who depends on others for basic care “fit to remain in prison” defies reason and conscience.

4. A delayed scan: When he began losing his ability to speak in February 2026, a brain MRI was ordered. It was carried out only about four months later, revealing severe narrowing of the blood vessels in his brain and a risk of stroke.

5. Every application rejected: For twenty months, his family repeatedly and publicly requested that his sentence be deferred. Human rights organisations appealed to the Ministry of Justice, and members of parliament raised his case in the Grand National Assembly. In November 2025, MP Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu asked in parliament: “If he dies in prison tomorrow, who will be responsible?” That question has never been answered.

6. The final days: During a visit in early October 2026, Tırpan was in a wheelchair with advanced gangrene in his left leg. He was admitted to hospital on 20 October, and in the early hours of 22 October his left leg was amputated below the knee. By then the infection had already spread above the amputation site. According to Gergerlioğlu, a request for a family member to be with him before the operation was refused. On 25 October he was moved to intensive care and intubated. His family learned this not from the authorities, but from e-Nabız, the state’s own patient portal. He died the next day.

We Condemn

We hold responsible, and condemn, those behind Abdullah Tırpan’s death: the judicial and prison authorities who kept a gravely ill elderly man behind bars; the Forensic Medicine Institution and hospital boards that issued reports detached from reality; the health system that delayed essential examinations for months; and the Ministry of Justice, which remained silent despite every warning.

This death is not an isolated case. According to the chair of the parliamentary sub-commission on prisons, 1,001 prisoners died in Turkish prisons in 2025. The Human Rights Association (İHD) identified at least 1,412 ill prisoners as of April 2025, 230 of whom are unable to sustain their lives on their own.

Our Demands

  • A prompt, independent, effective and transparent investigation must be opened into the death of Abdullah Tırpan.
  • The date, reasoning and medical basis of the Forensic Medicine Institution’s report must be made public.
  • Criminal and disciplinary proceedings must be initiated against the officials responsible.
  • The situation of all gravely ill prisoners in Turkey must be urgently reassessed, and the legal provisions on deferral of sentences must be applied in line with their purpose.
  • The independence of the Forensic Medicine Institution from political influence must be guaranteed.

We Will Not Let This Go

As World Human Rights Defenders – Berlin, we declare that, as with the other cases of neglect and rights violations we have brought to public attention, we will follow the case of Abdullah Tırpan until justice is done. We will continue to bring it before the public in Germany and across Europe, before the relevant institutions, and before international human rights mechanisms.

We remember Abdullah Tırpan with sorrow and respect.

Legal Provisions Violated

International human rights instruments

  • European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Art. 2 (Right to life): The state’s duty to protect the lives of persons in its custody and to provide necessary medical care; the duty to effectively investigate deaths in custody.
  • ECHR Art. 3 (Prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment): Continued detention of a prisoner whose health was incompatible with prison conditions, and failure to provide adequate treatment. See Gülay Çetin v. Turkey (2013).
  • ECHR Art. 7 (No punishment without law): Conviction based on acts that were lawful when committed. See ECtHR Grand Chamber, Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye (2023).
  • ECHR Art. 8 (Right to respect for family life): Failure to inform the family of the surgery and intensive care; refusal to allow a family member to be present before surgery.
  • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Arts. 6, 7 and 10: Right to life, prohibition of cruel and inhuman treatment, and humane treatment of persons deprived of their liberty.
  • UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules), Rules 24–27: Health care for prisoners equivalent to that available in the community, and timely access to specialist treatment in urgent cases.
  • European Prison Rules (Rec(2006)2), Rules 39–40: The state’s responsibility for safeguarding the health of prisoners.

Legislation of the Republic of Türkiye

  • Constitution, Art. 17: Right to life and to physical and mental integrity; prohibition of treatment incompatible with human dignity.
  • Constitution, Art. 38: Legality of crimes and punishments.
  • Constitution, Art. 56: The state’s duty to ensure everyone can live in physical and mental health.
  • Constitution, Art. 90 (final paragraph): Precedence of international agreements on fundamental rights over domestic law.
  • Law No. 5275 on the Execution of Sentences and Security Measures, Art. 2: Prohibition of cruel, inhuman, degrading and humiliating treatment in the execution of sentences.
  • Law No. 5275, Art. 16(3) and 16(6): Deferral of a sentence where imprisonment poses a definite danger to the prisoner’s life, or where serious illness prevents the prisoner from sustaining life alone in prison conditions.
  • Turkish Penal Code, Arts. 83, 85 and 257: The need to investigate those responsible for homicide by omission, negligent homicide and abuse of office.

World Human Rights Defenders – Berlin

#AbdullahTırpan #IllPrisoners #HumanRightsTurkey

WHRD Delivers a Clear Message at the OSCE Conference in Warsaw: Human Rights Law Does Not Fall Silent in War

World Human Rights Defender (WHRD) took the floor at the 2026 Warsaw Human Dimension Conference, presenting the international community with three key messages and three concrete recommendations on armed conflict, states of emergency, and the human rights obligations of States.

Speaking on behalf of WHRD at the conference was Kadir Noyan, lawyer and human rights activist.

The 2026 Warsaw Human Dimension Conference, held in Warsaw from 5 to 15 October 2026, brings together representatives of States, international organisations, and civil society to review the implementation of human dimension commitments across the OSCE region and to discuss human rights, the rule of law, democratic institutions, and fundamental freedoms.

The central message delivered by Kadir Noyan on behalf of WHRD was clear:

“Human rights law does not fall silent when the guns speak.”

Armed conflict does not suspend human rights law

Kadir Noyan emphasised that armed conflict does not bring States’ human rights obligations to an end.

Referring to the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice from 1996 and 2004, the European Court of Human Rights judgment in Hassan v. the United Kingdom, and the Grand Chamber’s 2025 judgment in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, WHRD stressed that international human rights law continues to apply during armed conflict, while international humanitarian law informs its application.

The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security likewise requires participating States to ensure that their armed forces operate consistently with international law and international humanitarian law.

The normative framework exists. The real challenge is its consistent application.

A state of emergency must not become a permanent form of governance

The second central issue raised by WHRD was the danger that exceptional powers introduced during periods of crisis may gradually become instruments of ordinary governance.

The OSCE’s 1991 Moscow Document requires emergency measures to remain strictly limited to the exigencies of the situation and the state of emergency to be lifted as soon as possible.

In his intervention, Kadir Noyan referred to Türkiye as an important example of the long-term consequences of emergency measures.

Although the state of emergency and Türkiye’s derogations from the European Convention on Human Rights ended in 2018, many of the legal and human consequences of measures adopted during that period continue today.

Well over 100,000 public officials were dismissed, and cases arising from these dismissals continue to reach national and international courts.

In particular, in Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights identified a systemic problem concerning convictions based on the domestic courts’ approach to the use of ByLock. Thousands of similar applications remain before the Court.

WHRD therefore underlined a fundamental principle:

Exceptional powers must not become ordinary instruments of governance.

Accountability must not be selective

The third part of the intervention called for the consistent and universal application of international legal standards.

Kadir Noyan stated that WHRD considers the mobilisation of OSCE mechanisms in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law to be important.

At the same time, the same legal standards must guide scrutiny of the cross-border military operations of every OSCE participating State.

In this context, WHRD called for Türkiye’s military operations in northern Syria and Iraq also to be scrutinised consistently under international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

WHRD expressly clarified:

This does not mean equating different conflicts or their respective legal character.

It means that international law must not depend on which State is acting or on the prevailing political circumstances.

Human rights and international humanitarian law obligations are universal. Selective application weakens the law. Ultimately, it also weakens the credibility of the OSCE’s own human rights framework.

Three concrete recommendations from WHRD

Kadir Noyan presented three concrete recommendations on behalf of WHRD:

1. To OSCE participating States:
Derogations from human rights obligations must be notified transparently, legally justified, and strictly time-limited. When the emergency ends, exceptional measures must also be dismantled.

2. To Türkiye:
The judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Yalçınkaya, Kavala and Demirtaş must be fully implemented. Obligations arising under Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights are not a matter of political discretion but binding obligations under international law.

3. To the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR):
ODIHR should use its mandate and expertise concerning states of emergency and derogations to systematically monitor and report on emergency measures across the entire OSCE region.

Human rights law is tested precisely in times of crisis

Kadir Noyan concluded his intervention on behalf of WHRD with a fundamental principle:

“Human rights law is tested not in normal times, but precisely when States say that normal rules can no longer apply.”

The true test of human rights law does not come in ordinary times. It comes precisely when States argue that ordinary rules can no longer apply.

WHRD will continue to advocate for the consistent application of international human rights law and against its selective application under the pretext of war, security, counter-terrorism, or states of emergency.

The universality of law is meaningful only if it can be upheld precisely when circumstances are at their most difficult.

 

Vicdanı Görünür Kıl – Announcement of the Competition Results

Announcement of the Competition Results

We would like to express our sincere gratitude to everyone who contributed their work to the competition organized as part of the 5th Strasbourg Gathering for Justice.

The evaluation of the submitted works took longer than initially expected. This was primarily because the members of our jury carefully assessed the entries according to several criteria, including aesthetic quality, strength of message, originality, and contribution to human rights advocacy.

As a result of the jury’s evaluation, none of the works submitted this year was considered eligible for the first-place award. We believe that one possible reason may have been the relatively limited period between the announcement of the competition and the submission deadline, which may not have provided participants with sufficient time to prepare their works.

Based on the scores awarded by the jury members, it was decided to present one second-place award and two third-place awards.

Second-Place Award – 250 euro

Rukiye Aydemir
Germany
78 points

Third-Place Award – 125 euro

Kübra Çetin
France
76 points

Third-Place Award – 125 euro

Gökhan Bozkurt
Germany
64 points

We congratulate the award recipients and once again thank all participants for their works, ideas, efforts, and contributions.

The HRD Secretariat will contact the award recipients through the contact information provided during registration. Their awards will be delivered to them as soon as possible.

We hope to come together again at future events dedicated to human rights advocacy, and we wish for a world in which justice is established for all people without discrimination.

Sincerely

HRD e.V. – Berlin
Human Rights Defenders

Ten Years After 15 July 2016

Massenermittlungen in der Türkei nach dem 15. Juli 2016

HRD
Human Rights
Defenders e.V.

Briefing Paper · July 2026

Human Rights and the Rule of Law

Ten Years After 15 July 2016

Persistent Threat Rhetoric, Mass Investigations and the Failure to Implement the Judgments of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR

An assessment of the operation launched on 13 July 2026 against 968 people in 81 provinces of Turkey

Published byHuman Rights Defenders e.V.
Behrenstraße 29 · 10117 Berlin
AuthorProf. Dr. Hüseyin Demir
Prepared forHuman rights organisations, the United Nations special procedures, the Council of Europe and the institutions of the European Union

The record in figures · Data announced by the Minister of Justice, 12 July 2026

720,338
People subjected to criminal proceedings since 2016
498,337
Decisions not to prosecute and acquittals (69.18%)
968
Suspects targeted by the operation of 13 July 2026 in 81 provinces
2
Grand Chamber judgments of the ECtHR: Yalçınkaya (2023) and Yasak (2026)
Decisions not to prosecute
Acquittals
Convictions
Pending proceedings

Approximately 69 per cent of all people subjected to proceedings were ultimately not convicted. Calculation and table in Annex 2.

About Human Rights Defenders e.V.

Human Rights Defenders e.V. (HRD) is a non-profit association dedicated to defending human rights and supporting persecuted people worldwide, with a particular focus on Turkey. HRD e.V. was founded in Germany by Turkish lawyers, former public officials and businesspeople who found political asylum in Germany and elsewhere in Europe.

HRD e.V. prepares reports on human rights violations and establishes contacts with other human rights NGOs and stakeholders, public authorities, and regional and international organisations. It provides legal advice to victims, initiates legal proceedings on their behalf, and prepares formal petitions and communications for the relevant United Nations bodies and European institutions.

Its aim is to help victims obtain justice through criminal law and human rights law. While criminal law addresses individual acts, human rights law also concerns the responsibility of the State. Most cases handled by HRD are first examined through criminal-law procedures at the national level. Where this proves insufficient, HRD turns to international bodies, such as the European Court of Human Rights or the competent organs of the United Nations. Where appropriate, HRD seeks to demonstrate that the State is unwilling or unable to investigate the offence in question and provide victims with truth and reparation.

Section 01Executive Summary

Ten years have passed since the attempted coup of 15 July 2016. The Turkish authorities state that the trials concerning the alleged direct participation of followers of the Gülen movement1 in the attempted coup have been completed. First-instance judgments have reportedly been delivered in 289 cases, bringing the legal “reckoning” over the coup attempt to an end. Yet the same authorities do not portray the movement as a threat that has diminished over time, but as a continuing danger to national security that can end only through collective surrender, “repentance” or “elimination” by the State.2

In line with this rhetoric, a nationwide operation targeting 968 suspects was launched on 13 July 2026, involving 81 chief public prosecutors’ offices, 81 provincial police departments and gendarmerie units. The operation was explicitly linked to the tenth anniversary of 15 July and announced in politically symbolic terms such as “cleansing campaign”, “survival of the State” and the “Century of Turkey”.3

In terms of scale, this is one of the largest judicial operations since the mass arrests during the 2016–2017 state of emergency and the 2019 operation targeting 1,112 people. Yet the published materials do not specify, for any of the 968 individuals, the alleged act, the evidence supporting the allegation or the required intent. Instead, the official statements rely on exceptionally broad categories such as “current structure”, “covert structure”, “hidden elements”, “new contact points”, finance, social groups and foreign connections.

This approach is fundamentally incompatible with the principles of legality, individual criminal responsibility and mens rea, as set out by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in its judgments in Yüksel Yalçınkaya and Şaban Yasak. The Grand Chamber made clear that, for a serious offence such as membership of an organisation, collective guilt and guilt by mere association are impermissible. Concrete evidence must establish that the individual knew of the organisation’s criminal nature, intended to join it and knowingly contributed to its criminal objectives.4,5

The figures published by the Minister of Justice likewise show that the scale of the new operation, in particular, requires critical scrutiny. The Minister stated that criminal proceedings had been initiated against 720,338 people since the coup attempt; no prosecution had been brought in 373,594 cases and 124,743 people had been acquitted. Together, these two categories comprise 498,337 people—approximately 69.2 per cent of all those subjected to proceedings. A system in which almost half a million people are ultimately not convicted should not be characterised as a “success”. From a human rights perspective, the low threshold for opening investigations, the resulting deprivation of liberty, loss of employment, subsequent stigmatisation and absence of effective remedies are matters of grave concern.6

The Turkish authorities must issue a public apology to those subjected to unfounded or unlawful proceedings. An effective mechanism must also be established to remedy losses relating to public office, professional status, pensions, social security, passports, property and reputation. Finally, the principles of individualised reasonable suspicion and rigorous judicial review must be upheld, since proceedings against a substantial proportion of the 968 people detained in the latest operation are likely eventually to be discontinued or to end in acquittal.

Section 02Purpose, Scope and Intended Audience of the Briefing Paper

The purpose of this briefing paper is to assess the operation of 13 July 2026 against approximately one thousand people not as an isolated criminal investigation, but in the context of a ten-year pattern encompassing mass investigations of members of the Gülen movement, official threat rhetoric and the implementation of the relevant judgments of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).

The latest development must be assessed from three perspectives:

  • First: Why, and on what basis, is a continuing threat asserted when the coup trials have officially been declared complete?
  • Second: Is there individualised reasonable suspicion and the required mens rea in respect of each of the 968 people?
  • Third: Why have the hundreds of thousands of people whose cases were closed without prosecution or ended in acquittal still not been compensated?

The principal addressees of this document are the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, the German and Austrian members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the European Parliament and international human rights organisations.

This paper demonstrates that, even ten years after the coup attempt, lawful everyday, social, economic, professional and humanitarian activities in Turkey continue to be reinterpreted, through broad and unforeseeable categories, as grounds for suspicion of membership of a criminal organisation.

Section 03An Official Contradiction Ten Years On: The Claim That “the Reckoning Is Complete” and the Continuing Threat Rhetoric

3.1. Official declaration that the coup trials have been completed

The Minister of Justice stated that all 289 cases concerning direct participation in the coup attempt had been completed at first instance; 236 of the 271 cases that reached the Court of Cassation had been upheld and become final, thus bringing the “legal reckoning” to an end. The same statement also asserted that the alleged organisational backbone within the State had largely been dismantled.7

These statements necessarily imply that the criminal proceedings directly connected with the coup attempt are essentially complete and that, according to the official account, the alleged operational capacity within State institutions has been eliminated. Nevertheless, the new operation was presented not as an investigation into specific past acts, but as an open-ended “cleansing policy” to continue “until the last hidden member is removed”.

3.2. Maintaining the threat narrative through collective and political rather than legal criteria

In an interview on 2 July 2026, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan linked the end of the security threat not to specific offences committed by individuals, but to declarations by the movement’s leadership—“repentance”, “regret”, a “request for forgiveness” or abandonment of an attitude directed against Turkey. Unless the movement dissolved or was otherwise “eliminated”, the matter would remain one of national security.8

This approach departs from the criminal-law criteria of individual conduct, culpability and proof. An individual’s criminal responsibility cannot be inferred from the political position of a large group, a public apology or a collective declaration of loyalty. Protecting national security is a legitimate duty of the State, but it cannot replace the requirement of individual criminal responsibility with a demand for collective submission.

The fundamental contradiction is clear: On the one hand, the State declares the coup trials and institutional purges complete; on the other, it reproduces the same threat to justify a “cleansing process” with no foreseeable end.

Section 04From Rhetoric to Operation

The days immediately preceding the operation can be divided into three phases.

2 July

Renewed declaration of a national-security threat

Hakan Fidan acknowledged that the movement had lost its former influence within public institutions. He nevertheless stressed that efforts at internal consolidation and cooperation with international actors continued. He said the organisational structures were now used primarily for “psychological operations”. Fidan expressly stated that the security authorities had to orient themselves according to this threat framework.

12 July

Definition of flexible threat categories

On 12 July, Minister of Justice Akın Gürlek described the movement as a “new-generation espionage network”. According to him, the network encompasses a “financial structure”, a “foreign structure”, “covert elements”, shell companies, business circles, various social groups and “new contact points” in everyday life.9

13 July

Nationwide operation against 968 people

The Minister of Justice announced that chief public prosecutors’ offices, together with the police and gendarmerie, had launched an operation against 968 suspects in all 81 provinces. Ankara, İzmir and Istanbul were identified as the provinces with the largest numbers of suspects, while investigations into “current structures”, “covert structures” and “affiliated elements” were said to be continuing in other provinces.10

The timing of the statements, the repetition of the same terminology and the incorporation of the operation into the tenth anniversary of 15 July indicate close coordination between judicial action and government communications.

Section 05Scale, Coordination and Symbolic Character

5.1. One of the largest simultaneously coordinated operations in recent years

The operation targeting 968 suspects is among the largest simultaneous measures since the arrest waves during the 2016–2017 state of emergency and the 2019 operation targeting 1,112 people. In 2017, arrest warrants were issued for 3,224 people; in 2019, 1,112 suspects were targeted across 76 provinces. In 2022, 543 of 704 people sought under warrants were detained, and in 2023, 611 people were detained in 77 provinces. In 2024, an operation targeting 544 people was announced against the “current structure”.11,12,13,14,15 The scale of the operation of 13 July 2026 exceeds the bounds of a routine investigation. (A comparative table is provided in Annex 1.)

5.2. Embedding judicial action in a political and symbolic framework

The official statement referred to the President’s leadership, a “major cleansing campaign”, the “survival of the State”, the “legacy of the martyrs” and the “Century of Turkey”. In this way, individual criminal investigations are transformed into components of a central State project and the tenth-anniversary commemorative campaign.

Investigations are announced with reference to the political leadership and an ideological vision of the State; this requires closer scrutiny of judicial independence and the presumption of innocence. The function of the judiciary is not to conduct a “cleansing campaign”, but to examine impartially the specific suspicion against each individual.

Section 06From Specific Offences to Flexible Categories: Legal Uncertainty and Collective Suspicion

6.1. The terms “covert element”, “current structure” and “new contact point”

Terms used in official statements—such as “covert element”, “current structure”, “new contact point”, “camouflage within a social group”, “financial channel” and “foreign structure”—do not constitute separate offences under the Turkish Criminal Code. They can form a basis for criminal investigations only if, in relation to a specific individual, they are connected to the objective and subjective elements of a concrete offence defined by law.

It is highly dangerous to classify ordinary relationships as camouflage and reinterpret lawful conduct—sharing a home, supporting a student, providing rent or maintenance assistance, professional solidarity, business relations, using social media, association activities or communicating with people abroad—as grounds for suspicion. Criminal suspicion and pre-trial detention must not follow merely from the existence of a social connection or rest on a generalised investigative logic. Concrete facts must show that the individual knew of the criminal purpose of the relationship and intentionally supported it.

6.2. The self-validating prosecution model

The logic of the official account leaves those concerned no way out: lawful acts can be interpreted as “camouflage”, while non-public conduct is treated as evidence that something is being “concealed”. Economic activity becomes a “cover”, social relationships become “contact points”, communication abroad becomes “cooperation with foreign actors”, and denial of the allegation becomes “lack of repentance”. Such a model replaces evidence-based individual responsibility with collective suspicion that can be neither verified nor disproved.

6.3. The allegation of an “espionage network” and the duty to substantiate it

The Minister of Justice described the group as a network of “political and military espionage”. Yet the published text contains no information identifying the foreign State or service for which those concerned allegedly acted. It remains unclear who allegedly obtained which State secret and how it was transmitted.16

Section 07Official Figures: Proceedings Against 720,338 People

7.1. What the figures announced by the Minister actually mean

The Minister of Justice stated that criminal proceedings had been initiated against 720,338 people since 2016. No prosecution was brought in 373,594 cases; 124,743 people were acquitted and 127,102 convicted. Proceedings against 83,404 people remain pending.17

The decisions not to prosecute and the acquittals together amount to 498,337 cases. This represents approximately 69 per cent of all people subjected to proceedings. Convictions account for about 17.6 per cent and pending proceedings for approximately 11.6 per cent. The calculation and table are set out in Annex 2.

7.2. Not a “success” in which to take pride

The Minister presents the number of acquittals as evidence of judicial diligence and proof that “the innocent are not punished together with the guilty”. Yet the fact that approximately half a million people underwent investigations or proceedings and were ultimately not convicted does not demonstrate judicial diligence. Rather, the figures raise questions as to whether the threshold of suspicion was too low from the outset, whether bulk lists were used and whether the criminal justice system became an instrument for society-wide screening. With a non-conviction rate of 69 per cent, the mass investigations cannot credibly be presented as a “success story”.

7.3. The human cost

A decision not to prosecute or an acquittal does not restore the lost years. Many of those affected experienced searches of their homes and workplaces, police custody and pre-trial detention, years of judicial-control measures, passport and travel restrictions, frozen assets, dismissal from public service, loss of employment in the private sector, professional bans, social stigmatisation and the breakdown of family ties. Children’s education and social lives, spouses’ livelihoods and the health of entire families were also harmed.

The Turkish authorities must disclose how many of the 498,337 people were detained or held in pre-trial detention, how many lost public office or their profession, how many were subjected to property or travel restrictions, how many received compensation and in how many cases entries in security databases were deleted. Without such disclosure, the official “record of the struggle” systematically conceals the human cost.

7.4. The State’s duty: apology, restoration of rights and effective compensation

Turkey must establish an independent, accessible and effective reparation programme for all those harmed by unfounded or unlawful measures. The programme must not be limited to individual compensation claims: the injustice caused by the widespread practice must be officially acknowledged and a public apology issued.

01Restoration of rights

Entitlements relating to public office, professional status, seniority, pensions, social security and education must be restored without delay.

02Correction of records

Stigmatising judicial, administrative, intelligence and risk-related records concerning people whose cases were closed without prosecution or ended in acquittal must be independently reviewed; entries lacking a legal basis must be deleted.

03Pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensation

A prompt and effective compensation mechanism must be created for deprivation of liberty, loss of employment and income, frozen assets, damage to health, interference with family life and reputational harm.

04Guarantee of non-repetition

Binding guidelines, training and oversight of decision-making practice must ensure that prosecutors and judges apply the Grand Chamber’s standards.

7.5. The renewed risk

The State’s own data show that a large proportion of those subjected to mass investigations are ultimately not convicted. The decisive question must therefore be asked now: in how many of the 968 cases will proceedings be discontinued or end in acquittal years later, after the individuals may already have lost their liberty, employment, family life, health or reputation?

This risk precludes waiting until the operation is complete before conducting a review. Safeguards—including individualised reasonable suspicion, proportionality, access to a lawyer, access to the case file and prompt judicial review—must operate from the first arrest warrant.

Section 08The Standards of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR: Yalçınkaya and Yasak

8.1. Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye

In its judgment in Yüksel Yalçınkaya, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held that treating the use of ByLock as automatically equivalent to membership of an organisation was incompatible with the guarantees of Article 7 ECHR against arbitrary prosecution, conviction and punishment. Under domestic law, the offence of membership of an organisation requires specific knowledge and intent, together with an organic link demonstrated by the continuity, diversity and intensity of activities. The Turkish courts had instead created an almost automatic presumption of guilt without examining the specific context, including the content of messages and the identities of communication partners.18

The Grand Chamber also found a violation of Article 6 ECHR because access to the ByLock evidence and the ability to challenge it effectively had been restricted. It further found a violation of Article 11 ECHR because membership of trade unions and associations had been used as incriminating evidence. Given the systemic nature of the problems, the Court expressly required Turkey to adopt general measures under Article 46 ECHR.19

8.2. Şaban Yasak v. Türkiye

In its Yasak judgment of 5 May 2026, the Grand Chamber reaffirmed that a conviction for a serious offence such as membership of an organisation must be based on individual criminal responsibility. Intent must be proved by concrete evidence concerning the nature of the relationship between the accused and the organisation; collective guilt and guilt by mere association are excluded.20

In the Court’s view, the applicant’s roles within the movement’s lawful and visible educational structures, before the national authorities classified the organisation as terrorist, were insufficient to establish that he knew of its terrorist character, intended to join it and actively and continuously contributed to its criminal objectives. The domestic courts’ failure to assess the individual’s intent, role and specific acts on a case-by-case basis amounted to a violation of Article 7 ECHR.21

8.3. Structural tensions in the light of the new operation

The official statement concerning the operation of 13 July 2026 relies on general categories such as “current”, “covert” and “affiliated” elements instead of identifying the specific acts alleged against each of the 968 people. The preceding official discourse had already treated social groups, economic activity, financial support, everyday contacts and foreign connections as general fields of suspicion. This approach is diametrically opposed to the examination required by Yalçınkaya and Yasak of individual knowledge, intent and conscious contribution.

Implementation of the Grand Chamber judgments is not limited to reviewing past convictions. New investigation and detention decisions must also be assessed against the same standards. Otherwise, the same pattern will be repeated against further individuals.

Section 09Key Issues Under the European Convention on Human Rights

9.1. Article 5 ECHR – Right to liberty and security

Police custody and pre-trial detention require reasonable suspicion based on facts capable of satisfying an objective observer, in the particular case, that the person may have committed an offence. Bulk lists, analyses of social networks or broadly defined categories of affiliation are not sufficient in themselves. It must therefore be established which concrete and individual facts support reasonable suspicion against each of the 968 people and whether the resulting deprivation of liberty is necessary and proportionate.

9.2. Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 ECHR – Fair trial and presumption of innocence

Suspects must have access to the case file and digital evidence, the opportunity to challenge the origin and integrity of the evidence, an independent review and the right to a reasoned decision. Terms such as “network of traitors”, “espionage network”, “cleansing of hidden elements” or “purification” risk portraying as guilty, in general terms, people who have not yet been tried by any court.

9.3. Article 7 ECHR – No punishment without law

The retrospective reinterpretation of lawful, neutral or everyday conduct as evidence of organisational membership can expand the objective and subjective elements of an offence in an unforeseeable manner. Administrative and intelligence categories such as “covert element”, “contact”, “financing” or “social group” cannot replace a criminal offence defined by law.

9.4. Articles 8, 10 and 11 ECHR – Respect for private life, freedom of expression and freedom of association

Interference with communications and network data, family and friendship ties, student house-sharing, mutual economic assistance, social-media activity, association work and professional solidarity is permissible only where lawful, necessary and proportionate. Branding human rights work abroad as “anti-Turkish” or a “psychological operation” creates a serious risk of restricting freedom of expression.

9.5. Article 18 ECHR – Limitation on the use of restrictions on rights

Although the evidence must be examined separately in each individual case, it must be determined whether restrictions on liberty and other rights pursue purposes other than the stated aim of criminal prosecution. Possible purposes include enforcing political loyalty, dismantling social solidarity or suppressing critical voices. The operation’s connection to the anniversary and its incorporation into a political vision of the State are factors warranting such examination.

Section 10The Presumption of Innocence, Stigmatising Language and Judicial Independence

Authorities may inform the public about counter-terrorism measures. Their statements must not, however, create the impression that people still under investigation are guilty, since criminal guilt cannot be predetermined before trial. Expressions such as “insidious octopus”, “network of traitors”, “mindless robots”, “espionage network”, “cleansing hidden elements” and “cleansing campaign” are dehumanising: they strip those concerned of their status as legal subjects and turn them into a social category to be “cleansed”.

Moreover, the actions of the chief public prosecutors’ offices, police and gendarmerie were announced in the name of the President’s leadership and political vision. Such language undermines confidence in the institutional independence of prosecutors and judges and creates a climate of pressure in which acquittals or decisions to discontinue proceedings may appear to be departures from State policy.

Section 11Failure to Implement the Grand Chamber Judgments and the Risk of Repetition

Under Article 46 ECHR, final judgments of the European Court of Human Rights are binding. In its Yalçınkaya judgment, the Court expressly held that the problems underlying the violation were systemic and that Turkey was therefore required to adopt general measures. Civil-society organisations may submit information on general and individual measures to the Committee of Ministers under Rule 9.2.

The new operation demonstrates that implementation of the judgments cannot be confined to past cases. The Turkish authorities must explain concretely how prosecutors and judges are trained, how intent is assessed in new proceedings, which safeguards prevent lawful activities from being used as incriminating evidence, by what standard mass digital and financial network analyses are converted into individualised reasonable suspicion, which procedures exist for reopening cases and deleting records, and which mechanisms ensure compensation and restoration of rights.

If these measures are not taken, the initiation of new mass proceedings under the label of the “current structure” will perpetuate, under new terminology, the patterns criticised by the Grand Chamber—automatic attribution of guilt and guilt by association.

Section 12Questions the Turkish Authorities Must Answer

  1. What specific offence is alleged against each of the 968 detained people, when was it allegedly committed, and what individual evidence exists?
  2. How many suspects are accused of conduct connected with violence, weapons, an attempted coup or coercion?
  3. How many people are being investigated solely because of social contacts, support for students, rent or maintenance payments, commercial activity, money transfers, social-media activity or foreign contacts?
  4. How were the standards on intent and individualisation developed in the Yalçınkaya and Yasak judgments applied before the arrest warrants were issued?
  5. What are the legal definitions and evidentiary standards for the terms “covert element”, “current structure” and “new contact point”?
  6. To which specific investigations, individuals, foreign States and transfers of information does the allegation of a “new-generation espionage network” relate?
  7. Was the timing of the operation chosen for investigative necessity, or was it administratively and communicatively coordinated with the tenth anniversary of 15 July?
  8. Do the 81 chief public prosecutors’ offices apply a uniform standard of reasonable suspicion and evidence?
  9. What data are maintained concerning the loss of liberty, employment, status, property and reputation suffered by the 498,337 of the 720,338 people whose cases were closed without prosecution or who were acquitted?
  10. What effective mechanisms exist for restoring rights, deleting records, issuing apologies and compensating those whose proceedings were discontinued or ended in acquittal?

Section 13Institutional Measures Required

13.1. Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe

The Committee of Ministers should examine the implementation of the judgments in Yalçınkaya and Yasak systematically and in a coordinated manner, and request detailed information from Turkey on the evidentiary threshold, assessment of intent and use of lawful activities in the operation of 13 July.

13.2. Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights

The Commissioner should immediately engage with the Turkish authorities concerning the scale of the operation, stigmatising official language, access to lawyers, deprivation of liberty and remedies following discontinuation or acquittal. Where appropriate, the Commissioner should make a public statement and initiate systematic monitoring.

13.3. United Nations special procedures

The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention should send a joint communication to Turkey and examine both individual cases and the broader patterns concerning the 968 people. Where there are specific indications of violations, the special procedures may issue urgent appeals or letters of allegation to States.

13.4. Institutions of the European Union

The European Commission and the European External Action Service should incorporate this issue into their political dialogue and rule-of-law monitoring concerning Turkey and seek information on implementation of the ECtHR judgments and the individual evidentiary basis for the operation against 968 people. The European Parliament should reiterate its demand for compliance with all ECtHR judgments, including implementation of the Yalçınkaya judgment.22

13.5. Human rights organisations

Human rights organisations should jointly monitor whether detainees have access to legal assistance, whether ill-treatment occurs, how health care is provided, the consequences for children and families, and the grounds and evidence on which detention is based. The suffering of those previously affected, who were acquitted or whose proceedings were discontinued, should be made as visible as the operation itself.

Section 14Conclusion

Ten years on, the question is no longer whether the trials of those directly involved in the coup attempt are continuing. The Turkish authorities themselves have stated that those proceedings are complete and that the alleged structures within the State have largely been eliminated. The fundamental problem today is the continual reproduction of the threat through a collective and deliberately vague national-security narrative, and the reinterpretation of ordinary social and economic relationships as allegedly criminal conduct under labels such as “covert elements”, “contact”, “financing”, “current structure” and “espionage”.

The operation of 13 July 2026 is among the largest mass judicial measures of recent years. An operation of this scale cannot serve as proof of success for an official commemorative campaign; it instead demands the strictest examination, for every individual, of reasonable suspicion, legality, intent, the presumption of innocence and proportionality.

The Minister of Justice’s own figures show that approximately half a million people were ultimately not convicted. These people are not a success statistic. The State must disclose how many lost their liberty, employment, health, property or reputation, and in how many cases family life was harmed. It must apologise to those wrongfully prosecuted, restore their rights and establish an effective reparation mechanism. To ensure that individuals are not vindicated only years later through discontinuation or acquittal, the Grand Chamber judgments in Yalçınkaya and Yasak must be applied from the very first day of the investigation.

Footnotes

  1. The Gülen movement, which is active in education and civil society, is classified as a terrorist organisation only in Turkey—for political reasons—and is referred to there as “FETÖ”. It is not recognised as a terrorist organisation in countries governed by the rule of law, nor by international institutions such as the United Nations, the European Union or the Council of Europe. ↩
  2. Sabah, “The latest scheme of the insidious octopus has been exposed! Minister of Justice Akın Gürlek speaks to SABAH: ‘It will continue until the last hidden member is eliminated’”, 12 July 2026, sabah.com.tr ↩
  3. Akın Gürlek, social-media post of 13 July 2026 and attached “press release”, x.com/abakingurlek ↩
  4. ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Yasak v. Türkiye, no. 17389/20, 5 May 2026, particularly §§ 200–213 on individual criminal responsibility, intent and the rejection of collective guilt; hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-250157 ↩
  5. ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye, no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023, particularly §§ 237–272 and 414–418; judgment and summary: hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-227636 ↩
  6. Figures cited in the interview with Akın Gürlek of 12 July 2026: criminal proceedings initiated against 720,338 people; 373,594 decisions not to prosecute; 124,743 acquittals; 127,102 convictions; 83,404 pending proceedings. For the source, see footnote 2. ↩
  7. Sabah, interview with Akın Gürlek of 12 July 2026, section entitled “289 coup cases completed”; see footnote 2. ↩
  8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, “Interview by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan with CNN Türk, 2 July 2026”, relevant section, mfa.gov.tr ↩
  9. Sabah, interview with Akın Gürlek of 12 July 2026; sections entitled “New-generation espionage network” and “They are trying to establish new contact points”; see footnote 2. ↩
  10. Akın Gürlek’s post of 13 July 2026 and the attached press release; see footnote 3. ↩
  11. Sabah, “Operation against FETÖ’s current structure: 544 suspects detained”, 14 May 2024, sabah.com.tr ↩
  12. Anadolu Agency, “611 suspects detained in ‘Kıskaç’ operations against FETÖ in 77 provinces”, 24 October 2023, aa.com.tr ↩
  13. Anadolu Agency, “Minister Soylu: 543 suspects detained in the ‘Gazi Turgut Aslan’ operation against FETÖ”, 18 October 2022: 704 arrest warrants, 543 detentions, aa.com.tr ↩
  14. Anadolu Agency, “1,112 detention warrants issued in FETÖ investigations”, 12 February 2019, aa.com.tr ↩
  15. Anadolu Agency, “1,120 people detained in an operation against FETÖ’s covert structure in 81 provinces”, 26 April 2017: warrants were issued for 3,224 people; 1,120 people were detained in the first phase, aa.com.tr ↩
  16. Sabah, interview with Akın Gürlek of 12 July 2026, section concerning espionage allegations; see footnote 2. ↩
  17. Sabah, 12 July 2026, interview with Akın Gürlek, sections entitled “A careful assessment by the judiciary” and “The fight against FETÖ in figures”; see footnote 2. ↩
  18. ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye, no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023; the Court held that the almost automatic presumption of guilt arising solely from the use of ByLock was incompatible with Article 7 ECHR. See the judgment, §§ 237–272, and ECtHR press release ECHR 267 (2023), hudoc.echr.coe.int (press release) ↩
  19. Yalçınkaya, findings under Articles 6, 11 and 46 ECHR; the Court held that the problems were systemic and that Turkey was required to adopt appropriate general measures. See the same judgment and press release. ↩
  20. ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Yasak v. Türkiye, no. 17389/20, 5 May 2026; the Court required intent to be established individually in convictions for membership of a terrorist organisation, excluding collective guilt or guilt by mere association. See ECtHR press release ECHR 114 (2026), hudoc.echr.coe.int (press release) ↩
  21. Yasak v. Türkiye, particularly concerning reliance on the applicant’s outwardly lawful educational activities, carried out before the organisation was classified as terrorist, as a basis for conviction without establishing the required intent; see §§ 200–213 of the judgment and the press release cited there. ↩
  22. European Parliament resolution of 10 February 2026 on the European Commission’s 2025 report on Turkey; calling on Turkey to implement fully the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, including Yüksel Yalçınkaya and related cases, europarl.europa.eu ↩

Annex 1Comparative Table of Major Operations

Date Location / scope People targeted Arrested / detained Target / note
16 July 2016 Denizli 515 — On the night of the coup attempt and the following day: military personnel; direct intervention.
16 July 2016 General Staff / Ankara 700 — Soldiers deployed during the coup attempt; direct intervention.
16 July 2016 Nationwide 2,745 — Detention warrants issued for judges and prosecutors.
11 August 2016 Nationwide 648 — Judges and prosecutors suspended from office.
17 December 2016 Primarily Istanbul 530 — Structure within the Turkish Armed Forces; senior military personnel.
26 April 2017 81 provinces 3,224 1,120 (first phase) Covert structure within the police.
12 February 2019 76 provinces 1,112 — 2010 entrance examination for deputy police commissioners.
18 October 2022 59 provinces 704 543 Gazi Turgut Aslan; finances and current organisational structure.
24 October 2023 77 provinces — 611 “Kıskaç” operations.
14 May 2024 Multiple provinces — 544 Current structure.
15 July 2025 64 provinces — 306 Measure announced on the anniversary.
13 July 2026 81 provinces 968 Not known Current or covert structure and affiliated elements; tenth anniversary.

Annex 2Overall Figures and Percentage Breakdown Announced by the Minister of Justice

Category Number of people Share Explanation
Total criminal proceedings 720,338 100% Total announced by the Minister.
Decisions not to prosecute 373,594 51.86% The investigations were closed without prosecution.
Acquittals 124,743 17.32% No conviction at the conclusion of the proceedings.
Decisions not to prosecute and acquittals 498,337 69.18% Approximately half a million people.
Convictions 127,102 17.64% Number of convictions delivered.
Pending proceedings 83,404 11.58% Investigations or court proceedings remain pending.

Note on the calculation: The percentages were calculated by dividing each category by the total of 720,338 and rounding to two decimal places. The official statement does not indicate whether the same person may be counted more than once in separate proceedings or precisely how the subcategories are composed.

Annex 3Source Documents and Links

  1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, interview with Hakan Fidan on CNN Türk, 2 July 2026: mfa.gov.tr
  2. Sabah, interview with Minister of Justice Akın Gürlek, 12 July 2026: sabah.com.tr
  3. Statement by Akın Gürlek on the operation of 13 July 2026: x.com/abakingurlek
  4. ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye, no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023: hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-227636
  5. ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Yasak v. Türkiye, no. 17389/20, 5 May 2026: hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-250157
  6. Council of Europe, information on civil-society communications under Rule 9: coe.int/en/web/execution/nhri-ngo
  7. AA, detention warrants for 2,745 judges and prosecutors, 16 July 2016: aa.com.tr
  8. AA, detention warrants for 3,224 people / 1,120 detentions, 26 April 2017: aa.com.tr
  9. AA, detention warrants for 1,112 people, 12 February 2019: aa.com.tr
  10. AA, “Gazi Turgut Aslan” operation, 18 October 2022: aa.com.tr
  11. AA, “Kıskaç” operation in which 611 people were detained in 77 provinces, 24 October 2023: aa.com.tr
  12. Sabah, operation against 544 suspects, 14 May 2024: sabah.com.tr
  13. AA, operation in 64 provinces in which 306 suspects were detained, 15 July 2025: aa.com.tr
  14. European Parliament resolution on Turkey, 10 February 2026: europarl.europa.eu
HRD · Human Rights Defenders e.V.

Behrenstraße 29 · 10117 Berlin

Briefing Paper · Ten Years After 15 July 2016 · July 2026
Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Demir

The State of Emergency That Is Not Meant to End

zehn-jahre-ausnahmezustand-tuerkei-15-juli-2016.jpg

Guest Contribution · Ten Years After July 15, 2016

The State of Emergency
That Shall Not End

Ten years ago, a coup attempt failed in Turkey. Its defense became the justification for a restructuring of the state that continues to this day: mass dismissals via name lists, a purged judiciary, criminal convictions without proof of individual guilt. The European Court of Human Rights has measured the mechanics of this decade in four binding judgments. To this day, they have not been enforced. Europe has taken note of this and has barely acted. On the tenth anniversary, it is time to draw consequences.

By Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Demir, Chairman of World Human Rights Defenders e. V.

Yüksel Yalçınkaya was a teacher in Kayseri, a pious industrial city in the Anatolian highlands. In the autumn of 2016, he lost his job by decree. His name was on a list appended to an emergency decree; no court had ever seen a piece of evidence against him. A year later, the judiciary delivered the verdict that the list had anticipated: six years and three months in prison for membership in a armed terrorist organization. The evidence: an encrypted messenger app on his phone, an account at a specific bank, membership in a trade union. None of this was punishable when he did it. The Turkish authorities attribute the app, ByLock, to the movement of the preacher Fethullah Gülen, whom Ankara considers the mastermind behind the coup attempt; the correctness of this attribution did not matter in the subsequent human rights proceedings.

In September 2023, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights declared this judgment incompatible with one of the oldest principles of criminal law: no punishment without law. Article 7 of the Human Rights Convention guarantees this principle, and its purpose is protection against arbitrary prosecution, conviction, and punishment. The Court found exactly this protection to be violated: the Turkish courts had almost automatically evaluated the mere use of the app as evidence of terrorist membership, without examining the knowledge and intent of the accused in the individual case. Such an expansive and unforeseeable interpretation of the criminal law, according to the Grand Chamber, equates to a presumption of guilt and effectively invalidates intent as an element of the offense (Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Turkey, §§ 259–272). The Court also recalled that Article 7 is non-derogable in times of emergency: a state may not deviate from it even if the life of the nation is threatened. Around 8,500 similar complaints were already pending in Strasbourg at that time.

The teacher’s case is not an isolated incident, but a building block of a system: the coup attempt of July 15, 2016, took place on the streets and was defeated there. Its defeat, however, provided the rationale with which the constitutional order was permanently restructured. And Europe is not a spectator in this finding, but a participant.

The night itself weighs heavily. A faction of the armed forces attempted to seize power. Tanks deployed in Ankara, the parliament was bombed for the first time in its history, and according to official figures, more than 250 people died. The Court has never disputed the seriousness of this situation. On July 21, 2016, Turkey notified under Article 15 of the Convention that it would derogate from certain guarantees, and the Court recognized that the life of the nation was threatened. What it rejected in one judgment after another was the conclusion that an attack on the constitutional order allowed its indefinite suspension. For Article 15 permits emergency measures only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. It is a narrowly tailored exception, not a general power of attorney. The Turkish leadership read it the other way around.

What followed was a “purge” at all levels. The state of emergency, initially limited to three months, was extended seven times; governance was conducted by decree, for a long time without effective judicial review. The UN Human Rights Office counted more than 150,000 dismissed or suspended public servants, well over 100,000 of whom were removed by name via lists: without charges, without a hearing, without individual justification. The dismissal amounted to a civil death. Passports were confiscated, pension entitlements cancelled, and the stigma made even employment in the private sector virtually impossible. The judiciary was hit first: more than 4,000 judges and prosecutors lost their offices, including two constitutional judges. One of them, Alparslan Altan, was detained without a legal basis, as the Court established in 2019. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe identified the pattern early on: collective dismissals without individual examination. Even legal protection became part of the design. The specially created inquiry commission, which the Court classified as a remedy to be exhausted first, approved only about one in seven of the approximately 127,000 decided applications.

Then there are the cases that had nothing to do with the coup. The publisher and philanthropist Osman Kavala has been in prison since October 2017. The Court found in 2019 that his detention in reality served the purpose of silencing him and deterring other human rights defenders. The Court makes such a finding under Article 18 of the Convention, which prohibits the misuse of permissible restrictions for ulterior motives, only in the gravest cases. In February 2020, Kavala was acquitted and re-arrested on the very same day before he could leave the prison. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe subsequently initiated the second infringement procedure in the history of the Convention. The judgment remains unenforced to this day; in March 2026, the Grand Chamber deliberated on a further complaint by Kavala. The opposition politician Selahattin Demirtaş has been detained since November 2016. From his cell, he campaigned for the presidency via video message in 2018 and wrote short stories that became bestsellers. The Grand Chamber established in 2020 that his continued detention was primarily aimed at stifling pluralism and limiting the freedom of political debate — and thus at what constitutes the core of a democratic society (Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey No. 2, § 437). This changed nothing: in January 2026, a Turkish court sentenced him to a further seventeen months in prison, this time for insulting the president. Locking away a promoter of civil society and a leading opposition politician sends the same message twice: the target of discipline is not only the state apparatus, but also the society that could control it.

Above all, however, the exception was made permanent.

In April 2017, in the midst of the state of emergency and under severely restricted public debate, a narrow majority voted for the introduction of the presidential system. Opposition media were shut down, political competition was distorted. Since then, the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which decides on appointments, promotions, and disciplinary proceedings in the judiciary, has been tied to the president and his parliamentary majority. The Venice Commission warned even then of a slide into a regime of personal rule.

In 2018, the state of emergency formally ended. Yet, with Law No. 7145, central emergency instruments were transferred into ordinary law: extended police custody, continuing dismissal powers, far-reaching restrictions on the freedom of assembly. The exception was not abolished; it was naturalized.

Meanwhile, defiance is no longer directed only against European judgments, but against the country’s own courts. When the Turkish Constitutional Court ordered the release of the lawyer Can Atalay, who had been elected to parliament from prison, the competent criminal court refused to implement it. The Court of Cassation filed a criminal complaint against the constitutional judges, and parliament stripped Atalay of his mandate.

A state whose courts defy its own constitutional court no longer even pretends internally that law binds power.

Why does this concern Europe? For three reasons, and none of them have to do with charity. First: Turkey has been a member of the Council of Europe since 1949 and is legally bound by every judgment of the Court. Every unenforced judgment — the Kavala judgment is the most visible — teaches all 46 member states that this binding nature is negotiable. The Convention system is not an internal Turkish affair, but the common legal order of the continent. And it erodes where its disregard remains without consequences. Second: The consequences have long since arrived here. Germany alone has granted protection to thousands of Turkish nationals since 2016, among them judges, diplomats, and officers of the very state that once employed them. Third: Turkey is a negotiating partner of the European Union, on migration, the customs union, and security. Anyone who negotiates without putting the question of the rule of law on the table has already answered it.

What then is to be done? Three steps, all within existing law. The Committee of Ministers should pursue the enforcement of the Kavala judgment with the same persistence with which it initiated the procedure under Article 46 paragraph 4 of the Convention; interim resolutions are not an end point, but tools. The member states should make the general measures required in the Yalçınkaya judgment, i.e., the correction of thousands of similar convictions, a fixed point on every bilateral agenda with Ankara. And German authorities and courts should draw the consequence that the judgment already dictates to them: a conviction based solely on the use of an app, a bank account, or a membership does not prove a criminal offense. Rather, according to the findings of the Court, it is itself the violation of the law. This applies to asylum procedures just as it does to extradition requests. None of this is radical. It is the mere application of judgments that have long since been rendered.

Yüksel Yalçınkaya has served his sentence. Today, his name stands over a judgment that in principle reaches thousands — and in reality meets courts that continue to be occupied and supervised by the bodies of the emergency state. Somewhere in Kayseri, there is a classroom from which a list removed him before any judge had ever heard his name. The tanks were stopped before morning. The lists and decrees of that time live on. Reversing them is not a Turkish task alone. It is a European one.

Why Rights Do Not Return Through Mercy

A right is not restored through the mercy of the oppressor, but through the restoration of the rule of law.

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Demir

For years, hundreds of thousands of people who were forced to leave Turkey after 2016 have been asking the same question: “When will this end?” Those who have lost their passports, been dismissed from public service, are under investigation, or cannot return to their country hope that this regime will one day come to an end. This hope is deeply human. From a legal perspective, however, it is not framed precisely enough.The real question is not when the oppression will end. It is: When will unchecked state power once again be subject to the rule of law?For what has happened in Turkey over the past decade cannot be explained either as a series of isolated mistakes or by the character of individual officials. These are the consequences of a form of government in which the legal order has been gradually replaced by political discretion. Anyone who interprets repression merely in moral or psychological terms misses the point. In such systems, repression is not an outburst of anger, but a technique of governance. As long as the institutional architecture that enables this technique remains intact, at most the form of the infringement changes—not the infringement itself.

Mercy and Law: A Legal Distinction

Over a century ago, the American legal scholar Wesley Hohfeld developed an analytical distinction that sheds remarkable clarity on today’s Turkish debate: mercy and law are not the same thing. Mercy is a benefit that those in power grant at will and revoke at will. A right, on the other hand, is a legal position that an individual can claim and enforce in court, and whose protection is the responsibility of the state.

The crucial point runs deeper. A right in the technical sense presupposes not only a corresponding duty on the part of the state, but also an immunity—that is, the rule that the state lacks the authority (disability) to unilaterally alter the legal position. Without this immunity, even a passport that has been formally returned remains merely a revocable benefit, not a right. This is precisely where the structural problem with Turkey’s state of emergency decrees since 2016 lies: Not only were new burdens imposed on individuals; the immunities that were supposed to protect them from such burdens were systematically eroded. The Venice Commission noted this in substance in its opinion CDL-AD(2016)037: There is a lack of individualized evidence, full judicial protection, a proportionality review, and independent review.

Therefore, the question of restoring rights that have been taken away involves two things at once: restitution in individual cases—and the rebuilding of the institutional architecture, without which this restitution cannot be permanent.

Why Authoritarian Regimes Do Not Voluntarily Restore Rights

Political science frames the question more matter-of-factly: Why should an authoritarian regime voluntarily relinquish one of its most effective instruments of power? Comparative research offers several consistent answers to this question.

First, any restitution is an implicit admission. A returned passport raises the question of the legal basis on which the original revocation occurred. Authoritarian regimes avoid such questions because they inevitably entail claims for accountability, compensation, and responsibility.

Second, as Milan Svolik has empirically demonstrated, repression in autocratic systems is not the exception but rather an instrument for securing power—both vis-à-vis society and within the regime coalition. A tool serving this function is not relinquished without good reason.

Third, as Hannah Arendt has already shown, such systems operate according to a logic of the categorical enemy: individuals are judged not by what they have done, but by the group to which they are assigned. The target group may change; the system’s need for an enemy remains.

Fourth—and this is what is discussed the least—autocratic leaders fear their own coalition less than they fear the voters. Any show of leniency can be interpreted internally as a sign of weakness. Leniency thus becomes less a moral issue than a strategic one.

Above all, however, the following holds true: Without independent institutions, promises made by those in power are not binding commitments. What is granted today can be revoked tomorrow. The classic finding of institutional economics by Douglass North and Barry Weingast can be directly applied to the debate on the rule of law: Without immunities secured by independent courts, rights remain political concessions.

The Historical Finding: Nine Countries, One Answer

This thesis can be tested against history. Where, in the last century, have rights that had been revoked been permanently restored—through a change of heart by those in power or through the restoration of the rule of law?

In the GDR, the Stasi files were not opened because the regime had changed its mind, but because the regime had collapsed; rehabilitation laws of 1991 and 1992 provided rights with a new legal basis. In the Soviet Union, the Stalinist injustices committed against millions could not be legally addressed until 1991—after the systemic change. In Chile, the amnesty law enacted by Pinochet in his own favor was later declared incompatible with international law by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Almonacid Arellano, 2006). Argentina repealed the amnesty laws of the military dictatorship (Law 25,779 of 2003; upheld by the Supreme Court in the Simón case, 2005). South Africa institutionalized the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by law; the Constitutional Court upheld this approach in the AZAPO case (1996). Spain’s “pacto del olvido” was initially accepted—and revised decades later by the laws on historical and democratic memory of 2007 and 2022. Poland’s Round Table Talks were not the result of the regime’s own goodwill, but of a shift in the balance of power. Finally, Romania and Bulgaria required years and numerous proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights to resolve structural property issues even after the transition to democracy (the landmark Maria Atanasiu ruling, 2010; structural findings in the Velikovi series, 2007).

One might object that in Spain, Brazil, or Taiwan, the opening came “from above.” That is true—and it does not refute the thesis, but rather clarifies it. Even in cases of an opening from above, lasting rights only emerge once independent courts, constitutional review, and free elections are institutionally entrenched. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s “only game in town” condition clearly distinguishes here between the beginning and consolidation: an act of opening may be a start; it is never a guarantee.

Strasbourg’s Response: Yalçınkaya and Yasak

This discussion is not abstract. Over the past three years, the European Court of Human Rights has assessed the situation in Turkey from a legal perspective in two Grand Chamber judgments.

In the judgment Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Turkey (Grand Chamber, September 26, 2023, Application No. 15669/20), the Court found that the mere use of the ByLock application is not sufficient grounds for a conviction for membership in an armed terrorist organization. It found not only an individual violation of Article 7 of the ECHR but also a structural violation: In light of over 8,000 similar complaints, the Court called for general measures under Article 46 of the ECHR, particularly regarding the approach of Turkish courts to ByLock evidence (para. 418).

On May 5, 2026, the judgment in Yasak v. Turkey (Grand Chamber, Application No. 17389/20) was handed down. The case itself is instructive. In August 2024, the Chamber had found no violation—a judgment that was criticized by legal experts as a step backward and was voted “worst judgment of 2024” in a reader poll conducted by the Strasbourg Observers. At the applicant’s request, the case was referred to the Grand Chamber under Article 43 of the ECHR, which overturned the Chamber’s decision by a vote of 11 to 6 (Article 7 of the ECHR) and 9 to 8 (Article 3 of the ECHR). In terms of substance, the Grand Chamber clarified in §§ 200–213 the requirements the Convention imposes on a conviction for membership in an armed terrorist organization: Criminal liability is individual; the subjective element of the offense (mens rea) must be proven separately for each defendant; the Court’s warning against liability by association (guilt by association, § 202) is unambiguous. Mere membership in an organization that was legally established at the time, a bank account, or employment at an educational institution is not sufficient to prove criminal intent.

The institutional level is also noteworthy: even the correction of a Chamber judgment in Strasbourg was not achieved through goodwill, but through the referral procedure under Article 43 of the ECHR. The thesis of this text is thus confirmed by the course of the proceedings themselves.

Taken together, both judgments amount to a single finding: this is not a matter of isolated errors, but of a systematic erosion of legal guarantees; the reversal must therefore be equally systematic. And it cannot be left to the goodwill of the Turkish authorities. Enforcement falls within the jurisdiction of the Committee of Ministers (Art. 46 of the ECHR). The fact that the procedure under Article 46(4) of the ECHR was actually applied in the case of Kavala v. Turkey (Grand Chamber, July 11, 2022; Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2022)21) demonstrates that the European human rights system is based not on trust, but on institutions.

Hope Is Not an Expectation

Why, despite all this, do many cling to the hope that things will one day sort themselves out? This can be explained not politically, but humanly. Persistent uncertainty is one of the heaviest burdens a person can bear; every source of support, every glimmer of confidence, every small piece of news takes on significance because it makes endurance easier.

But hope and expectation are not the same thing. Expectation is tied to the actions of others; hope to one’s own orientation. Václav Havel, who spent a large part of his life under a totalitarian regime, put it this way: Hope is not the conviction that things will turn out well, but the conviction that they have meaning—regardless of their outcome. This is precisely the essence of all human rights work. Gathering evidence, conducting proceedings, documenting standards, building institutions—none of this guarantees success; yet the significance of this work does not depend on success either.

No authoritarian regime has lasted forever. But no rule of law has ever emerged simply by waiting. Behind every such system lie years of legal work, the perseverance of civil society, international solidarity, and people who were not willing to give up on the truth. That will not change today either.

Let us not give up hope. But let us not pin our hopes on the goodwill of individuals, but rather on the primacy of the law. For what sustains people is not merely that they hope; it is what they base their hope upon.

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Demir is president of Human Rights Defenders e.V. (Berlin) and holds a Ph.D. in law from the University of Leeds.

References

  1. Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb. Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning. Yale Law Journal, 1913; later collected in Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays, Yale University Press, 1919.
  2. Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt, 1951.
  3. Svolik, Milan W. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
  4. North, Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 49, No. 4, 1989, pp. 803–832.
  5. Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
  6. Venice Commission. Turkey – Opinion on Emergency Decree Laws Nos. 667–676 Adopted Following the Failed Coup of 15 July 2016, CDL-AD(2016)037, adopted at the 109th Plenary Session, Venice, 9–10 December 2016.
  7. European Court of Human Rights. Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye, Grand Chamber, Application No. 15669/20, Judgment of 26 September 2023.
  8. European Court of Human Rights. Yasak v. Türkiye, Grand Chamber, Application No. 17389/20, Judgment of 5 May 2026.
  9. European Court of Human Rights. Kavala v. Türkiye, Grand Chamber, Article 46 § 4 proceedings, Judgment of 11 July 2022.
  10. Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2022)21 concerning Kavala v. Turkey, 2 February 2022.
  11. Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, Judgment of 26 September 2006, Series C No. 154.
  12. Supreme Court of Argentina. Simón, Julio Héctor y otros, Judgment of 14 June 2005.
  13. Argentine Republic. Law No. 25,779, declaring the nullity of the “Full Stop” and “Due Obedience” amnesty laws, 2003.
  14. Constitutional Court of South Africa. Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, Case CCT 17/96, Judgment of 25 July 1996.
  15. Spain. Law 52/2007 of 26 December, Historical Memory Law.
  16. Spain. Law 20/2022 of 19 October, Democratic Memory Law.
  17. Havel, Václav. Disturbing the Peace: A Conversation with Karel Hvížďala. New York: Knopf, 1990.

SYSTEMATIC PERSECUTION OF THE HIZMET MOVEMENT IN TÜRKİYE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 2025

SYSTEMATIC PERSECUTION OF THE HIZMET MOVEMENT

IN TÜRKİYE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

ANNUAL REPORT 2025

A documentation and legal assessment in light of Article 7 of the Rome Statute

Download pdf: SYSTEMATIC PERSECUTION OF THE HIZMET MOVEMENT 2025

SUMMARY

This report documents the arrests, detentions and judicial control measures carried out in Türkiye in 2025 against members of the Hizmet movement. It is based on publicly accessible official statements, operational announcements by the police and gendarmerie, and available open-source data. It assesses the documented practice according to the standards of international human rights protection and international criminal law.

The data for 2025 show that the practice in question exceeds the level of isolated security measures and displays a degree of continuity, coordination and systematic character that points to a different explanation: the measures conducted under the label of “terror operations” serve less to clarify specific acts of violence than to continuously reproduce a domestic political image of the enemy. Three findings support this conclusion in particular: the regular repetition of operations throughout the year, their simultaneous implementation in dozens of provinces at a time, and the almost verbatim recurrence of the same allegation patterns in official communications.

The allegations dominating the official statements, activity within the so-called “current structure”, contacts via public payphones, use of the ByLock messenger application, living in the same apartment, employment of persons dismissed by emergency decree, or joint business activity, overwhelmingly concern conduct that does not in itself constitute a criminal offence or whose connection to a specific violent act is not demonstrated. The investigative and prosecutorial practice is therefore not based on the determination of individual contributions to offences, but on the creation of collective suspicion on the basis of group and belief affiliation. This practice violates the presumption of innocence and systematically erodes the principle of legality, nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege.

A particularly notable dimension of the operations is the criminalization of everyday social and economic life. Joint learning, sharing an apartment, operating a döner restaurant, a pastry shop or a grocery store, as well as small-scale agricultural production, are made the subject of criminal investigations under the allegation of terrorist financing. The practice therefore does not merely deprive people of liberty; it deliberately attacks the material foundations and dignity of the affected community and produces the effect of an economic and social mechanism of exclusion.

The vague terms constantly repeated in official language, “crypto-structure”, “secret imam”, “infiltration”, “cell apartment”, “restructuring”, function less as legal qualifications than as propaganda language designed to generate a permanent perception of threat. This language legitimizes arrests and detentions in the public sphere and simultaneously turns ordinary social relations, neighbourhood, friendship, commerce and solidarity, into objects of suspicion. It thereby damages the social fabric as a whole.

In their cumulative effect, these measures lead to the exclusion of members of the Hizmet movement and their families from public life, to the loss of employment, housing, education and livelihood opportunities, and to the reshaping of their social networks through criminal suspicion. The report describes this phenomenon as “civil death”, a form of punishment that extends beyond prison walls. In view of the severity of the social destruction, some observers also describe the events sociologically as “social genocide”; the legal assessment of this report, by contrast, deliberately remains within the framework of crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, in particular persecution within the meaning of Article 7(1)(h).

The purpose of this report is not to allow the suffering endured to disappear behind the cold language of legal concepts, but to make it visible on the basis of data, to identify responsibility and to place on record for the international public the practice that continued in 2025.

Key Findings

  • Construction of an internal enemy and continuity: The periodicity of the operations and the uniformity of official language indicate that the continuous reproduction of an enemy image is driven less by a security need than by an interest in political consolidation.
  • Affiliation-based rather than act-based criminal law: Allegations such as “current structure”, “payphone contacts”, “ByLock”, “living in the same apartment” and “joint trade” form the core of the proceedings; individualized allegations have been replaced by a collective, affiliation-based logic of punishment.
  • Criminalization of everyday life: The linkage of work, trade, mutual assistance and social contact with terrorism suspicion operates beyond punishment itself as a mechanism of social isolation of the target group.
  • Dynamics of “civil death”: Through stigmatization, economic destruction, the severing of social ties and the narrowing of future prospects, punishment is extended beyond detention; the affected persons are effectively “made invisible while still alive”.

Methodology and Data Basis

The report is based on a dataset compiled from publicly accessible official statements, operational and judicial data documented in the press, statements by affected persons, conversations with defence lawyers, procedural documents, records from monitoring networks and systematic open-source research. The data were classified by date, number of affected provinces, type of measure, arrest, pretrial detention or judicial control measure, procedural outcome and fundamental-rights impact; quantitative indicators are combined with qualitative case descriptions in the sense of mutual validation.

As a methodological limitation, it must be noted that the allegations reproduced in the chronology are assertions by official bodies and not independently verified facts; the text consistently identifies them as such. Likewise, the arrest and detention figures are based on official communications; the actual figures are likely to be higher.

Recommendations

  • To Türkiye: In investigations and criminal proceedings against members of the Hizmet movement, the individualization of the allegation must be strictly ensured; the subsumption of nonviolent acts under terrorism offences must be ended; detention and judicial control orders must be subjected to effective judicial review according to necessity and proportionality.
  • To European institutions and international mechanisms: Regular reporting on the systematic pattern of repression, thematic sessions and country visits should be expanded; visible diplomatic and legal follow-up mechanisms should be activated against practices that erode fair trial rights and the principle of legality, above all the supervision by the Committee of Ministers of the implementation of the Yalçınkaya judgment under Article 46 ECHR.
  • To civil society and monitoring networks: Data standards should be strengthened; a minimum dataset should be created for every operation, including date, province, allegation, procedural outcome and source; testimonies of affected persons should be collected under secure conditions, and indicators for measuring “civil death” should be integrated into reporting.

 

 

OVERALL PICTURE 2025 AND STATISTICAL OVERVIEW

The measures directed against the Hizmet movement in 2025 reveal less a prosecution of concrete violent or terrorist acts than a regime that places a particular identity and affiliation under permanent pressure. The repetition of the operations throughout the year, their simultaneous execution in a large number of provinces and the stereotypical recurrence of the same allegation patterns show that this is not ordinary security work, but an element of politically motivated enemy construction.

Official Annual Figures 2025

According to Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya’s annual balance sheet, a total of 1,601 suspects were placed in pretrial detention in 2025 within the framework of operations against the Hizmet movement; judicial control measures were imposed on a further 1,524 suspects. This figure is consistent with the minister’s statement before the Grand National Assembly on 17 November 2025, according to which 1,395 persons had already been detained between 1 January and 31 October 2025. A consolidated official total number of arrests for 2025, however, was not published; the chronology of this report therefore documents the arrest figures mentioned in the individual statements operation by operation.

These figures are more than statistics. They stand for parents detained on legally questionable grounds, for families torn apart, for stigmatized people who lost their jobs, and for a state practice that inscribes itself into the memory of the affected children. The report therefore understands its task as keeping the human dimension visible behind the numbers.

For comparative classification: according to information compiled by human rights defenders through the portal Bold Medya, terrorism accusations were brought against 3,093,084 persons in Türkiye between 2016 and 2024; 527,100 persons were convicted of membership in a terrorist organization. Compared with the case numbers and conviction rates of other states and regions, magnitudes of this kind cannot be explained by ordinary criminal justice; they point to a politically motivated, affiliation-based indictment system.

Source: https://www.boldmedya.com/2025/11/21/turkiyede-soykirima-varan-sorusturmalar-2016-2024-arasinda-3-milyon-kisiye-terorist-suclamasi-yapildi/

Affected Persons by Month (Arrests)

Month Number of Affected Persons
January 228
February 594
March 73
April 205
May 426
June 537
July 577
August 49
September 233
October 329
November 93
December 269
TOTAL 3,613

Note: The table reproduces the monthly totals compiled from publicly available operational statements. The October value, 329, is higher than the sum of the operations individually documented in this report; the difference is due to province-based measures that were not the subject of separate statements.

Figure 1: Affected persons by month, 2025 (arrests; compiled from operational statements).

The Recurring Pattern of Operational Statements

In the official statements of 2025, a substantial part of the allegations is not based on specific acts of violence, but on a fixed inventory of labels and formulas. Almost every operation uses the same key terms: “current structure”, “contacts via payphones”, “ByLock”, “Gaybubet apartment” (hideout apartment) and “secret imam”. The most serious consequence of this pattern is that, in an environment without individualization of the allegation, a collective suspicion is generated through mere affiliation: even persons without a final conviction can be publicly marked with the label “terror” and pushed out of social life.

Beyond the Numbers: Three Functions of the Operations

Psychological dominance and propaganda. The monthly repeated operations clearly aim to establish psychological dominance across the country and to anchor the conceptual association of “Hizmet movement” and “terror” in collective consciousness. In their staging, the operations bear less the features of a security measure than those of a ritual that consolidates the government’s own support base and keeps the enemy image alive.

Continuation of the narrative of the “internal enemy”. Although more than nine years have passed since the attempted coup of 15 July 2016, the perception of a “continuing threat” is deliberately maintained; in this way, authoritarian security policies are legitimized and society is kept in a state of permanent alert. It is notable that no armed incident was recorded in any of the documented operations, yet students and housewives are presented to the public under headlines such as “Major terror operation”.

“Civil death” and economic destruction. Another function of the operations is to close off access to economic life for members of the Hizmet movement. Legal joint business activity is criminalized under the allegation of terrorist financing; companies employing affected persons themselves become targets. The result is the systematic narrowing of the material foundations of the target group.

 

 

CHRONOLOGY 2025: THE OPERATIONS BY MONTH

The following chronology arranges the operational statements that became public in 2025 in chronological order. Its purpose is not the mere listing of individual events, but the data-based demonstration of a permanent system of pressure based on the repetition of identical patterns and its effect of “civil death” on the target group. The allegations reproduced are consistently assertions by official bodies.

14 January 2025: Operation “Kıskaç-34” (23 provinces, 110 arrests)

The first operation of the year was carried out on 14 January. Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya announced that 110 suspects had been arrested within the framework of Operation “Kıskaç-34”, conducted simultaneously in 23 provinces under the coordination of the chief public prosecutors’ offices and the counter-terrorism (TEM), anti-smuggling and organized crime (KOM) and intelligence departments of the General Directorate of Security. They were accused of having been active within the “academic, military and current structure” of the organization, of living in so-called “Gaybubet apartments”, of maintaining contact with “responsible persons” via payphones, of having been “coded as preferred” in examination procedures and of having used ByLock. According to the statement, foreign currency, Turkish lira, documents and digital data carriers were seized.

Source: https://www.dha.com.tr/gundem/23-ilde-feto-operasyonu-110-gozalti-2565636

18 January 2025: Operation “Kıskaç-35” (23 provinces, 47 arrests; 33 pretrial detentions, 1 judicial control measure)

In the operation conducted in 23 provinces under the coordination of the Gendarmerie General Command, 47 persons were arrested; 33 of them were placed in pretrial detention, and judicial control measures were imposed on one person. The allegations included activity within the “current structure”, contacts via payphones, financing of the organization and propaganda on social media.

Source: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/fetoye-yonelik-kiskac-35-operasyonlarinda-yakalanan-33-supheli-tutuklandi/3454218

Figure 2: Statement by Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya on Operation “Kıskaç-35” (X, January 2025).

24 January 2025: Operation “Kıskaç-36” (27 provinces, 71 arrests)

Interior Minister Yerlikaya announced that 71 suspects had been arrested in Operation “Kıskaç-36”, led from Istanbul and carried out simultaneously in 27 provinces, including Ankara, Izmir, Antalya, Bursa, Kayseri, Manisa and Gaziantep. The allegations were activity within the “current structure”, propaganda on social media, payphone contacts and ByLock use. The statement did not explain what concrete connection to an offence existed among such a large number of persons across such a wide geographical area, nor on the basis of which individual acts the arrests were made. It was further stated that persons named in statements and confrontations, or persons against whom final prison sentences and wanted notices existed, had also been arrested; the minister emphasized the “determined” continuation of the measures.

Source: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/fetoye-yonelik-kiskac-36-operasyonlarinda-71-supheli-gozaltina-alindi/3460873

Figure 3: Women arrested within the framework of the operations (press photo, January 2025).

4 February 2025: Operation “Kıskaç-37” (29 provinces, 93 arrests)

According to official information, 93 suspects were arrested in operations coordinated by the TEM, KOM and intelligence departments in 29 provinces, including Adana, Ankara, Antalya, Bursa, Istanbul, Izmir, Konya and Trabzon. The allegations concerned activity within the “secret military structure” and the “student structure”, payphone contacts and ByLock use. According to the statement, the arrested persons also included individuals who had been named in statements or against whom final sentences existed.

Source: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/fetoye-yonelik-kiskac-37-operasyonlarinda-93-supheli-gozaltina-alindi/3471043

Figure 4: Image of a raid disseminated through official channels as part of the “Kıskaç” operations.

10 February 2025: Operation “Kıskaç-38” (22 provinces, 45 arrests; 24 pretrial detentions, 8 judicial control measures)

In the operation conducted in 22 provinces under the coordination of the Gendarmerie General Command, 45 persons were arrested; 24 were placed in pretrial detention, and judicial control measures were imposed on 8. The allegations were activity within the “current structure”, payphone contacts, financing of the organization and propaganda on social media.

Source: https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/kiskac-38-operasyonlarinda-45-supheli-yakalandi

Figure 5: Arrest as part of Operation “Kıskaç-38” (press photo, February 2025).

Figure 6: Presentation of the arrested persons at the courthouse (February 2025).

15 February 2025: Operation “Kıskaç-39” (39 provinces, 103 arrests)

According to official information, 103 persons were arrested in operations conducted in 39 provinces. The allegations included activity within the “secret military” and “student” structures, payphone contacts, “preferred coding” in selection procedures, “preparation for state examinations in organizational apartments”, living in “Gaybubet apartments” and ByLock use. Almost all allegations thus relate to patterns of conduct that either do not constitute a criminal offence or whose evidentiary value has been fundamentally called into question by the case law of the ECtHR.

Source: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/fetoye-yonelik-kiskac-39-operasyonlarinda-103-zanli-yakalandi/3482788

21 February 2025: Operation “Kıskaç-40” / Maydonoz Döner (31 provinces, 353 arrests)

In Operation “Kıskaç-40”, led from Antalya and conducted simultaneously in 31 provinces, 353 suspects were arrested on the allegation that they had financed the organization through a döner restaurant chain, Maydonoz Döner. Subsequently, the state Savings Deposit Insurance Fund, TMSF, was appointed as trustee over 21 companies operating under the brand “Maydonoz Döner”. Referring to the death of Fethullah Gülen, the interior minister declared that there was “no room for any easing” in the “struggle”.

This operation crystallizes one of the report’s central findings: the fact that persons engage in trade together, establish companies and employ certain individuals was qualified as “terrorist financing”; on this basis, company assets were confiscated. Ordinary economic activity itself thereby becomes incriminating evidence.

Source: https://icisleri.gov.tr/kiskac-40-operasyonlarinda-353-supheli-yakalandi

Figure 7: Press report on the operation against the restaurant chain Maydonoz Döner: 353 arrests in 31 provinces, trusteeship over 21 companies.

19 to 27 March 2025: Simultaneous operations (27 provinces, 73 arrests; 48 pretrial detentions, 16 judicial control measures)

In operations conducted by gendarmerie and police units in 27 provinces, 73 suspects were arrested; 48 were placed in pretrial detention, and judicial control measures were imposed on 16. The allegations were activity within the “secret military and current structure”, payphone contacts, ByLock use, financing and social media propaganda. The announcement was made via the interior minister’s social media account, in a language, “secret structure”, “cell apartment”, “terror financing”, “secret communication”, designed to generate fear and anxiety.

Source: https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/19-27-mart-2025-tarihleri-arasinda-27-ilde-fetopdy-silahli-teror-orgutune-yonelik-operasyonlar-duzenlendi

Figure 8: Balance-sheet statement by the interior minister on the operations of 19 to 27 March (X).

11 April 2025: Operation against “digital and financial structures” (41 suspects, 36 arrests; 20 pretrial detentions, 16 judicial control measures)

In the operation led from Istanbul and involving Ankara, Yozgat and Gümüşhane, official sources stated that the “encrypted communication and foreign-funded financial networks” of the organization had been targeted. According to the statement, the investigation was triggered by the finding that persons who had been subject to judicial measures, dismissals or arrest records were socially insured at an Istanbul company. The company was accused of providing work to persons “close to the organization”, filling positions not according to qualifications but according to “organizational position”, and harming the state by enabling their retirement through the payment of social security contributions. According to the statement, 27,440 euros, 128,629 US dollars, 452,522 lira in cash and gold worth approximately 826,413 lira were seized, altogether assets with a market value of 7,358,559 lira, as well as digital data carriers and gift cards.

The operation marks the scope of the practice: even the employment and payment of persons stigmatized or convicted because of their affiliation with the Hizmet movement becomes the subject of investigation. The criminalization of employment itself demonstrates the institutionalization of the social isolation of the target group.

Source: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/istanbul-merkezli-feto-operasyonunda-36-zanli-yakalandi/3534747

30 April 2025: Simultaneous operation in 42 provinces (169 arrests)

According to official information, 169 suspects were arrested in operations conducted in 42 provinces. The allegations included activity within the “current, financial, student and secret police and military structures” and within various professional groups, social media propaganda, payphone contacts, “preferred coding” in selection procedures and ByLock use. According to the statements, unregistered pistols and rifles as well as foreign currency, lira, documents and digital data carriers were seized.

Source: https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2025/04/30/42-ilde-feto-operasyonu-169-supheli-yakalandi

Figure 9: Official statement on the operations in 42 provinces (X, 30 April 2025).

11 May 2025: Operation led from Gaziantep (47 provinces, 228 arrests; 77 pretrial detentions)

In operations coordinated by the Gaziantep Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office and the General Directorate of Security and carried out simultaneously in 47 provinces after one year of technical and physical surveillance, 228 suspects, including businesspeople, were arrested; 77 of them were placed in pretrial detention. The allegation was that meetings had been held in Türkiye and abroad through encrypted communication programs and that the organization had been financed through companies established by members.

Source: https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/47-ilde-operasyon-duzenlenmisti-fetonun-yeni-taktikleri-desifre-oldu-4705822

Figure 10: Arrest by officers of the counter-terrorism unit (TEM) during the operation led from Gaziantep (press photo).

16 May 2025: Simultaneous operation in 27 provinces (101 arrests)

In operations conducted under gendarmerie coordination in 27 provinces, 101 suspects were arrested. The allegations were activity within the “current structure”, the use of payphones and “organization-specific communication methods”, social media propaganda and financing.

Source: https://haber240.com/gundem/fetoye-27-ilde-operasyon-101-kisi-gozaltinda-20388h

Figure 11: Official statement on the gendarmerie operations in 27 provinces (X, 16 May 2025).

23 May 2025: Operation against military personnel (36 provinces, 63 arrest warrants; 56 arrests)

Arrest warrants were issued against 63 active military personnel on the grounds that they were connected to the attempted coup of 15 July 2016; in operations led from Istanbul and conducted in 36 provinces, 56 of them were arrested. The affected persons belonged to the Air Force (8), the Army (36), the Navy (6) and the Gendarmerie General Command (13); their ranks ranged from 4 colonels, 8 lieutenant colonels, 12 majors and 15 captains to 24 non-commissioned officers.

The same statement published the cumulative balance sheet of measures directed against military personnel: since 15 July 2016, 1,915 operations had been carried out against soldiers; 28,194 persons had been recorded, 25,801 arrested, 8,992 placed in pretrial detention, 13,968 released under judicial control measures and 2,841 released without measures; 2,393 suspects were considered fugitives. The fact that the operations continue almost nine years after the attempted coup and after investigations against millions of persons with unchanged intensity supports the assessment that the perception of threat is kept on the agenda for political reasons.

Source: https://tr.euronews.com/2025/05/23/15-temmuz-darbe-girisimiyle-iliskili-63-askeri-personel-hakkinda-gozalti-karari

Figure 12: Press report: “56 active soldiers arrested” (23 May 2025).

28 May 2025: Operation led from Izmir (34 arrest warrants)

Within the framework of an operation based on the allegation of the “current structure”, arrest warrants against 34 persons were announced. The suspects were accused of using pastry and künefe businesses as “sham companies”, making deductions from employees’ wages and transferring them to the organization under the name “Himmet”, holding “organizational meetings” in the businesses and transferring financial resources amounting to 40 million lira in this way; the use of the business “like a cell apartment” was also among the allegations.

Source: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/fetoye-yonelik-izmir-merkezli-operasyonda-yakalanan-13-supheli-

24 to 27 June 2025: Nationwide operations (46 provinces, 361 arrests)

In operations conducted simultaneously in 46 provinces under the coordination of the ministry, a total of 361 persons were arrested. The allegations were activity within the “current structure”, the “secret military structure”, the financial network and the “current educational structures”, ByLock use, payphone contacts and social media propaganda.

The simultaneous counter-statement by journalist Sevinç Özarslan documents the gap between the official account and the actual events: in Izmir alone, 45 persons, including 38 female students, were reportedly arrested, their sole allegation being that they lived in the same apartment. Children of parents imprisoned because of their affiliation with the Hizmet movement are detained because the student apartments they share are qualified as “cell apartments of the organization” and placed under the allegation of “restructuring”.

Source: https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/fetoye-46-ilde-operasyon-361-gozalti-912085.html; https://x.com/sevincozarslan/status/1938482407876805051

Figure 13: Arrests during the operations at the end of June (press photo).

Figure 14: Official statement: 361 arrests in 46 provinces (X, June 2025).

Figure 15: Counter-statement by journalist Sevinç Özarslan: “Not terrorists, but female students were hunted” (X, 27 June 2025).

24 June 2025: Arrest warrants against military personnel (31 provinces, 176 persons)

Within the framework of an investigation led by the chief public prosecutors’ offices of Istanbul and Izmir, which according to the official account targeted the “structure of the movement within the armed forces”, a simultaneous operation was conducted from Istanbul in 31 provinces; arrest warrants were issued against a total of 176 active and former soldiers. The Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office stated that the central investigative method consisted of identifying contacts allegedly made by “civilian persons responsible for soldiers” via prepaid telephone lines in kiosks, markets and payment points as well as via public payphones; arrests and detentions were based on these connection data. The fact that such connection data serve as central incriminating evidence raises serious questions of legality and fair trial in light of the Yalçınkaya case law of the ECtHR.

Source: https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/feto-sorusturmasinda-176-askere-gozalti-karari-911690.html

1 July 2025: Operation in 30 provinces (156 arrests)

In operations conducted under gendarmerie coordination in 30 provinces, 156 persons were arrested. The allegations were activity within the “current structure”, payphone contacts, financing and social media propaganda. In this wave as well, numerous students were arrested and detained under the allegation of the “current structure”.

Source: https://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/gundem/30-ilde-feto-operasyonu-156-kisi-yakalandi-1127533

14 July 2025: Operation in 20 provinces (50 arrests; 33 pretrial detentions, 5 judicial control measures)

In operations conducted in 20 provinces, including Ankara, Bursa and Izmir, 50 suspects were arrested; 33 were placed in pretrial detention, and judicial control measures were imposed on 5. The allegations included activity within the “current structure”, payphone contacts, the financing of “so-called aid organizations close to the organization” and social media propaganda.

Source: https://x.com/AliYerlikaya/status/1944631748605657119

15 July 2025: Operations on the 9th anniversary of the attempted coup (60 provinces, 371 arrest warrants)

On the anniversary of 15 July, large-scale operations are regularly carried out, presented in pro-government media under headlines such as “major terror operation” and clearly serving to consolidate public perception. It is notable that no armed incident occurred in any of these operations and not a single weapon or item of ammunition was seized; a significant proportion of the arrested persons are students accused of “restructuring” or whose shared apartments are qualified as “cell apartments”.

In this context, arrest warrants were issued on 15 July 2025 against 371 suspects in an operation led from Izmir and covering 60 provinces. In a separate procedure led from Istanbul, the supermarket chains HAKMAR and TATBAK were placed under trusteeship and their assets confiscated on the allegation of financing the Hizmet movement. According to the official account, funds had been collected through fictitious food sales to persons “recorded for FETÖ membership” in Türkiye and abroad and forwarded as “food packages” to members of the organization. The fact that even food assistance for affected families is qualified as terrorist financing shows the extent of the criminalization.

Source: https://www.indyturk.com/node/761869/haber/15-temmuz%E2%80%99un-9-

16 August 2025: Simultaneous operation in 29 provinces (49 arrests)

In operations conducted by the gendarmerie in 29 provinces, 49 suspects were arrested. The allegations were activity within the “current structure”, payphone contacts, the financing of “so-called aid organizations close to the organization” and social media propaganda.

4 September 2025: Operation in 21 provinces (41 arrests)

In operations conducted in 21 provinces, including Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, 41 arrested persons were accused of having been active within the “IT structure and the current structure”, maintaining contact with “responsible persons” and living in “Gaybubet apartments”.

Figure 16: Press report on the operations in 21 provinces (4 September 2025).

10 September 2025: Operation in 19 provinces (53 arrests; 40 pretrial detentions)

In operations conducted in 19 provinces, 53 suspects were arrested; 40 of them were placed in pretrial detention. According to official information, the measures were directed against persons linked to the “current structure”, the use of payphones, and propaganda and financing activities. The fact that three quarters of those arrested were detained is a striking indication that pretrial detention has become the rule rather than the exception.

Figure 17: Press report: 40 of 53 arrested persons placed in pretrial detention (10 September 2025).

21 September 2025: 39 operations within one week (97 arrests); investigations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Interior Ministry announced that 39 separate operations had been carried out within one week and 97 suspects arrested. In this context, on 17 September 2025, arrest warrants were issued against 15 persons in the course of investigations into the “secret structure” in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to the investigations led by the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, the suspects are accused of ByLock use, “sequential” calls from payphones and landlines, and being named in third-party statements; 6 of them had previously been removed from service, 8 were still on active duty at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 1 person was employed at another authority.

30 September 2025: Operation led from Izmir against the “military structure” (16 provinces, 42 arrest warrants)

Within the framework of an investigation led from Izmir, operations were carried out in 16 provinces; arrest warrants were issued against 42 suspects on the allegation of links to the “secret military structure”.

3 October 2025: Operations in 30 provinces (91 arrests; 64 pretrial detentions, 3 judicial control measures)

Interior Minister Yerlikaya announced that 91 suspects had been arrested in operations conducted by the gendarmerie in the preceding two weeks in 30 provinces; 64 of them had been placed in pretrial detention, and judicial control measures had been imposed on 3. The operations covered, among others, Ankara, Antalya, Aydın, Bursa, Denizli, Edirne, Eskişehir, Gaziantep, Hatay, Istanbul, Izmir, Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Konya, Kütahya, Manisa, Mardin, Mersin, Muğla, Ordu, Osmaniye, Sinop, Tekirdağ, Trabzon and Yozgat. The allegations were activity within the “current structure”, payphone contacts, financing and social media propaganda.

The fact that the allegations are overwhelmingly based on terms of doubtful evidentiary value and that the detention rate exceeds 70 percent supports the assessment that the aim is not criminal prosecution, but collective punishment.

Figure 18: Arrest by gendarmerie units (press photo, October 2025).

30 October 2025: Operation led from Istanbul (11 provinces, 22 arrests; 10 pretrial detentions)

Within the framework of an investigation by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, 22 suspects were arrested in an operation carried out simultaneously on 28 October in Ankara, Elazığ, Gaziantep, Giresun, Kahramanmaraş, Kocaeli, Manisa, Mersin, Tekirdağ and Trabzon. After the prosecutorial interrogations, the criminal judgeship of peace ordered pretrial detention for 10 suspects and judicial control measures for the others. The statements highlighted the term “secret imam structure”; a significant proportion of the suspects had evidently been removed from public service years earlier.

The evidentiary basis of the proceedings is notable: statements by cooperating witnesses, datasets on an SD card belonging to an anonymous witness with the code name “Garson” (“Waiter”), account movements at Bank Asya, and “sequential” calls qualified as the organization’s “secret communication method”. All of these types of evidence raise serious questions of reliability and legality in light of the principles developed in the Yalçınkaya judgment of the ECtHR.

Figure 19: Transfer of suspects in the operation led from Istanbul (press photo, October 2025).

17 November 2025: Simultaneous operation in 27 provinces (71 arrests)

In operations coordinated by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Istanbul Police Directorate and carried out simultaneously in 27 provinces, including Ankara, Izmir, Antalya, Bursa, Kayseri, Manisa and Gaziantep, 71 suspects were arrested. According to the prosecutor’s statement, the investigation targeted 80 persons qualified as “secret police imams” within the “secret police structure”; 40 of them were public officials, including teachers, academic staff and medical personnel, and 40 were employed in the private sector. According to the statement, 8 suspects were abroad and 1 person was wanted. The evidence cited included cooperating-witness statements, sequential call logs, ByLock use and transactions at Bank Asya.

The fact that the target group consists mainly of current or former public-sector employees and that the model of simultaneous large-scale raids was chosen points to the intimidation and mass-impact function of the practice. In the same period, the interior minister stated before parliament that 1,395 suspects had been detained in this context between 1 January and 31 October 2025. Simultaneous raids in 20 to 30 provinces create throughout society the perception of an ever-present threat of state intervention and thereby directly impair the right to liberty and security.

Figure 20: Arrest in front of the Nizip District Gendarmerie Command (official dissemination, November 2025).

18 November 2025: Operation by the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office (9 provinces, 22 arrest warrants)

The Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office announced that, within the framework of investigations into the “secret services structure” within the Army, arrest warrants had been issued against 22 suspects. They were accused of having maintained contact with their “secret imams” via public payphones. Among those sought were reportedly 8 active soldiers, 6 retired soldiers, 4 soldiers previously dismissed from the army, 3 public officials and 1 person employed in the private sector; the operations were carried out in Ankara and eight other provinces.

In a significant proportion of the proceedings, the allegation is based on connection-data analyses, past social contacts and witness statements. The weight of cooperating-witness statements suggests that the cooperating-witness regime has effectively become a system for producing statements.

Figure 21: Image disseminated by official bodies concerning the operation of the Ankara Prosecutor’s Office.

9 December 2025: Operation against the “financial network” (6 provinces, 13 arrest warrants)

In operations carried out simultaneously in six provinces under the coordination of the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, arrest warrants were issued against 13 suspects on the allegation of being active in the organization’s “financial network”. They were accused of forwarding collected funds to persons against whom judicial measures had already been taken, or to their families, and of participating in “entrepreneurial structures”. The fact that material support for families with imprisoned relatives is prosecuted as a terrorism offence shows that the criminalization mechanism even encompasses humanitarian solidarity.

16 December 2025: Operation in 39 provinces (160 arrest warrants; 90 pretrial detentions)

In operations conducted under the coordination of the TEM, KOM and intelligence departments in 39 provinces, including Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, arrest warrants were issued against 160 persons; 90 were placed in pretrial detention. The allegations were ByLock use, payphone contacts and activity within the “secret services structure” of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the “current”, “educational”, “financial” and “secret military” structures.

21 December 2025: Gendarmerie operation in 28 provinces (76 arrest warrants; 50 pretrial detentions)

In operations conducted by gendarmerie units in 28 provinces, arrest warrants were issued against 76 persons; 50 of them were placed in pretrial detention. Mass arrests and mass detentions carried out across such a wide geographical area without specification and individualization of the allegation are a clear indication that persons are treated as members of a terrorist organization solely on the basis of their religious or worldview affiliation.

25 December 2025: Operation “secret structure in public service” (20 arrests)

Under the coordination of the terrorism investigations bureau of the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, 20 persons, including public officials, were arrested within the framework of investigations into the “secret structure in public service”, directed against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Finance and subordinate authorities. They were accused of communicating via “special and secret lines”; cooperating-witness statements and records of “sequential or individual” calls from payphones and landlines were also said to exist. Of the affected persons, 5 were in active service, 14 were previously dismissed public officials, and 1 person was a civilian.

In summary, according to Interior Ministry data, as a result of the operations continued without interruption in 2025 by police and gendarmerie units, a total of 1,601 suspects were placed in pretrial detention; judicial control measures were imposed on 1,524 suspects.

 

 

CASE ANALYSES

The following cases were selected in order to concretize, at the level of individual fates, the patterns demonstrated by the quantitative data. The information is based on statements by affected persons, their defence lawyers and open sources.

Case 1: Student apartment or “cell apartment”? (Operations June to July 2025)

In the operations of 24 to 27 June and 1 July, students were specifically targeted under the allegation of the “current structure”. The 21-year-old student A.K., who studies in Izmir, was arrested in the apartment she had rented together with fellow female students in order to share costs. Everyday circumstances, the textbooks found in the apartment, joint grocery purchases and observance of a household order, were qualified by the prosecutor’s office as “organizational discipline” and “activity of a cell apartment”. Although A.K. was not linked to any violent act, the fact that her parents had been dismissed by emergency decree and her religious lifestyle were sufficient for the allegation of “membership in a terrorist organization”.

The case illustrates how the principle of personal criminal liability is breached and responsibility is extended through family ties and social environment. A practice that reaches even the children of members of the Hizmet movement recalls the institution of Sippenhaft known from German legal history and recognized there as unlawful.

Case 2: From slicing döner to “terrorist financing” (Operations February 2025)

In the operation against the Maydonoz Döner chain on 21 February 2025, 353 persons were arrested. The teacher M.Y., dismissed by emergency decree, had begun working as a waiter in one of the chain’s establishments in order to secure his livelihood. His receipt of wages and WhatsApp correspondence with colleagues were treated as incriminating evidence under Law No. 6415 on the Prevention of the Financing of Terrorism; the fact that part of the business profit was passed on as food aid to families of detainees was regarded as “organizational financing”. With the criminalization of the economic activity of persons trying to remain in working life, M.Y. lost both his work and his liberty; the case illustrates the economic dimension of “civil death”.

Case 3: “Stretched death” in prisons: seriously ill pretrial detainees

Data and testimonies from 2025 show that the practice of delaying treatment for seriously ill prisoners, in its actual consequences, amounts to a nullification of the right to life. Illnesses are driven into an irreversible stage through bureaucratic obstacles, the rejection of transfer requests, forced examinations in handcuffs and “fit for detention” reports by the Forensic Medicine Institute (ATK); once death becomes unavoidable, release takes place so that the death is not statistically recorded as a “death in custody”.

(a) Lawyer Süleyman Yıldırım. The requests by lawyer Süleyman Yıldırım, imprisoned within the framework of Hizmet-related proceedings, for transfer to a full-service hospital were rejected for months despite the serious illness that was worsening in detention, with references to “lack of personnel”, “unavailable appointments” and “security reasons”; the illness progressed under the superficial treatments of the prison infirmary. Even after diagnosis, access to life-sustaining therapies remained disrupted; the ATK certified his fitness for detention even at an advanced stage. The execution of the sentence was postponed only when Yıldırım no longer responded to any treatment. He died at home around three months after his release. The course of events exceeds a violation of the state’s duty to protect life under Article 2 ECHR and reaches the dimension of inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3 ECHR.

(b) English teacher Hakan Kanat. Hakan Kanat was diagnosed with thyroid cancer while in pretrial detention in Kırşehir Prison. At the stage when surgery was required, his transfers were delayed and his access to treatment restricted. Despite warnings by his family and defence lawyers of danger to life, the detention was maintained; Kanat was released only after the cancer had metastasized and no medical intervention was still possible. He died shortly afterwards. His petitions, which became known after his death, document that his pleas to survive remained unanswered.

Taken together, the two cases show that these were not isolated acts of negligence, but a prison practice that uses illness as an instrument of punishment and accepts its foreseeable consequences.

Legal assessment. The cases go beyond the phenomenon described in the literature on detention conditions as “slow death”: the state prevents treatment despite knowledge of the illness, foresees the occurrence of death and accepts it. Domestically, this raises the question of intentional killing by omission under Article 83 of the Turkish Criminal Code; if applied systematically against a particular group, assessment under Article 7(1)(b), “extermination”, and Article 7(1)(k), “other inhumane acts”, of the Rome Statute is required. According to the case law of the ECtHR, the continued detention of a terminally ill prisoner, or release only in the final moments of life, already violates the prohibition of inhuman treatment (Gülay Çetin v. Turkey, no. 8714/08, 5 March 2013).

 

 

OPERATIONAL TRENDS AND DATA ANALYSIS 2023 TO 2025

The data published at regular intervals by the Interior Ministry and the open-source analysis show that the waves of mass arrests that began after 15 July 2016 continue nine years later as a systematic state routine. The political leadership has continued its operational activity without interruption even after the death of Fethullah Gülen, invoking the “prevention of easing” and the “prevention of restructuring”.

Year Operations Arrests Pretrial Detention
2023 6,775 9,639 1,689
2024 (Jan. to Oct.) approx. 4,100 approx. 7,500 1,400+ (end of year approx. 1,700)
2025 not specified approx. 3,613 (from statements) 1,601 (+1,524 judicial control measures)

Sources: Activity data of the Interior Ministry for 2023 and public statements by Minister Yerlikaya; the values for 2024 are based on official figures for the first ten months; the 2025 arrest total was calculated from the chronology of this report.

In the overall picture, the detention figures, after the record values of 2023, stabilized in 2024 and 2025 at a steady base level, annually 1,500 to 1,700. This very stability argues against the assumption of a response to an acute security situation: it demonstrates that the operations have solidified into a permanent, effectively quota-like administrative practice whose purpose is to keep a particular social milieu under permanent pressure.

INDICTMENT PATTERNS AND CRIMINALIZATION MECHANISM

This section systematizes the allegation patterns that recur in 2025, that is, the identical architecture of suspicion produced through identical formulas. The described repression regime deals less with individual acts than it targets an entire community through the repetition of specific labels. These labels do not remain in procedural files; they migrate into headlines, social media, neighbourhood relations and working life. As a result, not only the freedom of the affected persons is attacked, but also their social existence.

1. The Logic of Affiliation-Based Accusation

The common language of the operational statements in 2025 does not attach to individual acts, but to affiliation. The “FETÖ” framework continuously reproduced in official rhetoric and the security apparatus carries a membership-based policy of hostility. Hundreds of persons are accused and detained within the same conceptual framework without their actions being examined individually or concrete allegations being specified. The affected persons are publicly convicted before they enter a courtroom; stigmatization and exclusion from civil life function as a de facto punishment independent of the judgment. State penal power therefore operates not only through court decisions, but also through social isolation.

2. The Criminalization of Housing and Social Contact

Students who share an apartment are detained under the labels “Gaybubet apartment” and “cell apartment”. Living under one roof, belonging to the same environment, working in the same company, going to the cinema or on a picnic together, elementary facts of everyday life can suddenly be transformed into criminal conduct. This practice affects the persons concerned not only legally, but also socially: by criminalizing even job searches, gatherings and shared leisure time, all social ties of the target group are severed. In this way, the mechanical procedure of condemnation to “civil death” is kept in motion.

3. Vague, Fear-Inducing Labels

The operational statements use vague, alarming formulas, “crypto-structure”, “secret imam”, “infiltration”, “cell apartment”, “restructuring”, that are continuously repeated and shape public perception. The language used is not legal, but propagandistic; social suspicion is kept permanently alive, and the human features of the target group are erased from the public image until only the abstract figure of a “threat” remains. Material assistance for affected families or shared housing by students can be treated under the heading of “current structure” as terrorist activity.

4. The Criminalization of Ordinary Business Activity: the Allegation of “Terrorist Financing”

Another tendency frequently observed in 2025 is the linkage of economic activity with the language of accusation. Livelihood-securing practices, döner snack bar, pastry shop, grocery store, small-scale production, farm products, craft sales, are criminalized through the topic of “terror financing”. The particular weight of this type of allegation lies in the fact that it affects not only the person, but the basis of existence: whoever loses the source of income together with his or her family loses, alongside liberty, the possibility of sustaining life. This is the directly economic dimension of condemnation to “civil death”.

 

 

LEGAL FRAMEWORK: THE VIOLATED FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

The following section assigns the documented allegation patterns to the violated fundamental principles of national and international law.

Principle of Legality (Art. 7 ECHR; Art. 15 ICCPR; Art. 38 Turkish Constitution)

According to the fundamental principle of criminal law, offence and punishment must be defined by law, and the individual must be able to foresee what conduct will lead to what sanction. This principle is guaranteed not only by Article 38 of the Turkish Constitution, but also by Article 7 ECHR and Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As the report documents, the scope of criminality is expanded through vague labels; the principle of legality is thereby effectively eroded, and the affected persons are placed in a state of legal unforeseeability. In the judgment Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye, the ECtHR identified precisely this pattern, the quasi-automatic conversion of circumstances such as ByLock use into a conviction for membership, as a violation of Article 7.

Presumption of Innocence (Art. 6(2) ECHR; Art. 14(2) ICCPR)

The presumption of innocence requires that every person be treated as innocent until guilt is legally established. The form in which the operations are publicly presented systematically violates this presumption: the simultaneous announcement of large numbers of persons in identical headline language, and the media display of images and identities, create social prejudgment already at the investigation stage. The affected persons lose employment, reputation and social environment before they stand trial, one of the fastest paths into “civil death”.

Individualization of the Allegation and the Principle of Personal Criminal Liability

Criminal law is directed at persons, not communities; the allegation must attach to the concrete act of the person and must identify time, place, intent and effect. In the statements of 2025 and the documented cases, by contrast, allegations are formulated predominantly without individualization and embedded in an affiliation narrative. Everyday behaviours, living in the same apartment, working in the same business, trading together, social contact, are made the basis of terrorism suspicion without being connected to a concrete violent act. The affected persons are judged not according to their acts, but according to their networks of relationships and affiliation; this is the open logic of collective punishment.

Right to Liberty and Security; Prohibition of Arbitrariness (Art. 5 ECHR; Art. 9 ICCPR)

Deprivation of liberty is permissible only insofar as it is lawful, necessary and proportionate. The continuity of the operations, their geographical scope and the affiliation-based mass arrests and detentions show that deprivation of liberty has become a widespread practice rather than an exception. The fact that detention decisions are not based on an examination of necessity and proportionality, but fulfil an intimidation function, gives the practice a structurally arbitrary character and satisfies the criteria of arbitrary detention within the meaning of Article 9 ICCPR.

Right to a Fair Trial and Evidentiary Standard (Art. 6 ECHR)

A fair trial is not a formality confined to the courtroom; the reliability of evidence, the manner in which it is obtained, the establishment of its connection to the person and the reality of adversarial proceedings are among its core elements. As the ECtHR has emphasized in its judgments concerning Hizmet-related proceedings, the boundaries of criminal law are expanded in a shapeless manner, legal acts are treated as incriminating evidence and criminal proceedings are diverted through the topic of counter-terrorism. The excessive reliance on cooperating-witness statements, the abstract nature of the evidence and the practice of collective proceedings are incompatible with the standards of Article 6.

Freedom of Expression and Association; the Narrowing of Civic Space (Arts. 10 and 11 ECHR)

The repression regime is not confined to criminal law; it weakens the civic fabric of society as a whole. The fact that every social contact, every act of assistance, every business relationship, sometimes even a greeting, with the target group can trigger suspicion effectively restricts the freedoms guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 ECHR. People fall silent, withdraw and become invisible; this process forms the social dimension of condemnation to “civil death”.

Freedom of Religion and Conscience; Prohibition of Discrimination (Arts. 9 and 14 ECHR)

The fact that the operations selectively affect a belief-shaped community creates belief-based stigmatization and impairs freedom of thought, conscience and religion protected by Article 9 ECHR. The fact that the same practice is directed exclusively against this community also raises serious questions under the prohibition of discrimination in Article 14.

“Civil Death” and Its Contact with International Criminal Law

The practice against the Hizmet movement that has continued for nearly a decade is not exhausted by detentions and prison sentences. Exclusion from employment, criminalization of trade, stigmatization, the severing of social ties, the targeting of children and the destruction of future prospects condense into a practice that condemns the target community step by step to “civil death”. The intensity, duration and state coordination of this practice require assessment not only at the level of human rights violations, but also under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, namely under the offences of persecution (Article 7(1)(h)) and systematic deprivation of liberty (Article 7(1)(e)).

 

 

INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (2025)

The practice presented by the Turkish government as an “internal matter” was consistently assessed and criticized by international mechanisms in 2025 as unlawful.

1. European Commission Türkiye Report (November 2025)

The European Commission’s enlargement reports continue to state that the judiciary is used as an instrument to suppress political opposition. The reports emphasize that the concept of terrorism is interpreted with a breadth incompatible with international norms and that the law is instrumentalized; the types of evidence underlying the “Kıskaç” operations, ByLock, account movements and others, would not in themselves be sufficient for conviction under European standards.

2. The ECtHR Judgment Yüksel Yalçınkaya and the Continuing Practice

In the judgment Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye (no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023), the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held that the quasi-automatic conversion of circumstances such as ByLock use and account movements at Bank Asya into a conviction for membership in an armed terrorist organization violated Article 7 ECHR, no punishment without law, Article 6(1), fair trial, and Article 11; the Court emphasized the structural character of the problem and pointed to the need for general measures under Article 46. The fact that the same criteria continue to serve as the central basis of accusation in the operations of 2025 demonstrates Türkiye’s open disregard of its Convention obligations.

3. Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (2025)

At its meetings in June, September and December 2025, the Committee of Ministers found that Türkiye is not implementing the Yalçınkaya judgment; it identified the systemic character of the violation and kept supervision under Article 46 on the agenda.

4. Torture and Ill-Treatment: the CPT Report 2025

The report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), published in February 2025, points to overcrowding in Turkish prisons and deficiencies in access to health care. The finding documented there of “obstruction of access to treatment for ill prisoners” coincides with the pattern described in Case 3 of this report and supports assessment under Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute.

5. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025

HRW characterizes the situation in Türkiye in its World Report 2025 as the “normalization of repression”; judicial harassment of persons with links to Hizmet has become routine, and anti-terror legislation is being misused to silence civil society.

The mechanisms of the United Nations also repeatedly emphasize that the broad and vague application of counter-terrorism law intensifies restrictions on civic space, damages freedom of expression and association, and that the criminalization of ordinary social and economic activities is incompatible with human rights. These findings reinforce the core thesis of the report: terrorism allegations that attach to everyday nonviolent relationships and livelihood practices are an unacceptable abuse of power not only under national law, but also under international human rights standards.

 

 

CONCLUSION AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT

When the operations of 2025 are viewed in their entirety, it becomes clear that almost all allegations attach to patterns of conduct of which the ECtHR and the UN Human Rights Committee have repeatedly found that they do not in themselves constitute a criminal offence.

The operations conducted throughout the year demonstrate that state practice toward the Hizmet movement has left the framework of individual criminal prosecution and has turned into a regime of collective punishment based on belief and affiliation. Without proof of concrete violent acts, social relations, economic activities and everyday life practices are made the central element of the terrorism allegation; through official rhetoric and pro-government media, the target group is systematically dehumanized. This picture does not testify to a security need, but to the continuation of a political-ideological construction of an enemy image.

The suspicion-generating system of this regime is not based on the concrete connection between act and perpetrator, but on a structure indexed to identity and affiliation. Abstract labels such as “current structure”, “crypto-structure” and “secret organization” have replaced the determination of criminal conduct; criminal law is transformed from an instrument of truth-finding into an instrument of intimidation. The fact that people live together, support one another, work in the same business, establish companies, run businesses, pay wages and trade is converted into a terrorism allegation without reference to a concrete violent act, in systematic violation of the principle nullum crimen sine lege.

Judicial proceedings are accompanied by factual enforcement effects in society: stigmatization, exclusion from work, restriction of housing, damage to the educational and social environments of children, and the tearing apart of neighbourhood and family ties condemn the affected persons step by step to “civil death”.

In legal terms, it follows that arrests and detentions in 2025 were not based on concrete violent acts, but on presumptions of affiliation; this produces arbitrary deprivation of liberty, violation of the right to a fair trial, narrowing of the space of religious freedom and systematic violation of the prohibition of discrimination. The practice therefore violates Articles 5, 6, 9 and 14 ECHR as well as Articles 9 and 18 ICCPR.

The nationwide continuity of the operations, their coordination by state bodies and their orientation toward a specific social segment make an assessment beyond the level of human rights violations unavoidable from the perspective of international criminal law. The result is a permanent state practice aimed at the economic, social and legal elimination of a community. This finding contains elements that must be seriously discussed within the framework of Article 7 of the Rome Statute, namely persecution (Article 7(1)(h)) and systematic deprivation of liberty (Article 7(1)(e)).

The picture of 2025 shows that the judicial practice conducted under the title of counter-terrorism has become a system of social displacement, a system that criminalizes even the most ordinary everyday acts, pushes the affected persons to the margins of society, isolates them socially and destroys their future. The aim of this report is to make visible both the legal violations of this system and the human wreckage it leaves behind.

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Demirören Haber Ajansı. (2025, 14 January). 23 ilde FETÖ operasyonu: 110 gözaltı. URL: https://www.dha.com.tr/gundem/23-ilde-feto-operasyonu-110-gozalti-2565636. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Anadolu Ajansı. (2025, 18 January). FETÖ’ye yönelik Kıskaç-35 operasyonlarında yakalanan 33 şüpheli tutuklandı. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/fetoye-yonelik-kiskac-35-operasyonlarinda-yakalanan-33-supheli-tutuklandi/3454218. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Anadolu Ajansı. (2025, 24 January). FETÖ’ye yönelik Kıskaç-36 operasyonlarında 71 şüpheli gözaltına alındı. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/fetoye-yonelik-kiskac-36-operasyonlarinda-71-supheli-gozaltina-alindi/3460873. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Anadolu Ajansı. (2025, 4 February). FETÖ’ye yönelik Kıskaç-37 operasyonlarında 93 şüpheli gözaltına alındı. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/fetoye-yonelik-kiskac-37-operasyonlarinda-93-supheli-gozaltina-alindi/3471043. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı. (2025, 10 February). Kıskaç-38 operasyonlarında 45 şüpheli yakalandı. URL: https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/kiskac-38-operasyonlarinda-45-supheli-yakalandi. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Anadolu Ajansı. (2025, 15 February). FETÖ’ye yönelik Kıskaç-39 operasyonlarında 103 zanlı yakalandı. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/fetoye-yonelik-kiskac-39-operasyonlarinda-103-zanli-yakalandi/3482788. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı. (2025, 21 February). Kıskaç-40 operasyonlarında 353 şüpheli yakalandı. URL: https://icisleri.gov.tr/kiskac-40-operasyonlarinda-353-supheli-yakalandi. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı. (2025, March). 19-27 Mart 2025 tarihleri arasında 27 ilde FETÖ/PDY silahlı terör örgütüne yönelik operasyonlar düzenlendi. URL: https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/19-27-mart-2025-tarihleri-arasinda-27-ilde-fetopdy-silahli-teror-orgutune-yonelik-operasyonlar-duzenlendi. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Anadolu Ajansı. (2025, 11 April). İstanbul merkezli FETÖ operasyonunda 36 zanlı yakalandı. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/istanbul-merkezli-feto-operasyonunda-36-zanli-yakalandi/3534747. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Sabah. (2025, 30 April). 42 ilde FETÖ operasyonu: 169 şüpheli yakalandı. URL: https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2025/04/30/42-ilde-feto-operasyonu-169-supheli-yakalandi. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Yeni Şafak. (2025, 11 May). 47 ilde operasyon düzenlenmişti: FETÖ’nün yeni taktikleri deşifre oldu. URL: https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/47-ilde-operasyon-duzenlenmisti-fetonun-yeni-taktikleri-desifre-oldu-4705822. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Haber240. (2025, 16 May). FETÖ’ye 27 ilde operasyon: 101 kişi gözaltında. URL: https://haber240.com/gundem/fetoye-27-ilde-operasyon-101-kisi-gozaltinda-20388h. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Euronews Türkçe. (2025, 23 May). 15 Temmuz darbe girişimiyle ilişkili 63 askeri personel hakkında gözaltı kararı. URL: https://tr.euronews.com/2025/05/23/15-temmuz-darbe-girisimiyle-iliskili-63-askeri-personel-hakkinda-gozalti-karari. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Şehir Medya / Anadolu Ajansı. (2025, 30 May). FETÖ’ye yönelik İzmir merkezli operasyonda yakalanan 13 şüpheli tutuklandı. URL: https://www.sehirmedya.com/gundem/feto-ye-yonelik-izmir-merkezli-operasyonda-yakalanan-13-supheli-tutuklandi-466576. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Habertürk. (2025, 27 May). Künefe zincirine FETÖ operasyonu: 33 gözaltı. URL: https://www.haberturk.com/kunefe-zincirine-feto-operasyonu-33-gozalti-son-dakika-haberleri-3794053. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

TRT Haber. (2025, 27 June). FETÖ’ye 46 ilde operasyon: 361 gözaltı. URL: https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/fetoye-46-ilde-operasyon-361-gozalti-912085.html. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Özarslan, S. (2025, 27 June). Social media post on arrests of female students in İzmir. X. URL: https://x.com/sevincozarslan/status/1938482407876805051. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

TRT Haber. (2025, 24 June). FETÖ soruşturmasında 176 askere gözaltı kararı. URL: https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/feto-sorusturmasinda-176-askere-gozalti-karari-911690.html. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Türkiye Gazetesi. (2025, 1 July). 30 ilde FETÖ operasyonu: 156 kişi yakalandı. URL: https://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/gundem/30-ilde-feto-operasyonu-156-kisi-yakalandi-1127533. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Yerlikaya, A. (2025, 14 July). Statement on FETÖ operations in 20 provinces. X. URL: https://x.com/AliYerlikaya/status/1944631748605657119. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Independent Türkçe. (2025, 15 July). 15 Temmuz’un 9. yıldönümü’nde FETO operasyonları. URL: https://www.indyturk.com/node/761869. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı. (2025, 16 August). İçişleri Bakanımız Sayın Ali Yerlikaya: 29 ilde FETÖ’ye yönelik Jandarmamız tarafından son 10 gündür devam eden operasyonlarda 49 şüpheliyi yakaladık. URL: https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/icisleri-bakanimiz-sayin-ali-yerlikaya-29-ilde-fetoye-yonelik-jandarmamiz-tarafindan-son-10-gundur-devam-eden-operasyonlarda-49-supheliyi-yakaladik. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Anadolu Ajansı. (2025, 16 August). FETÖ’ye yönelik operasyonlarda 49 şüpheli yakalandı. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/fetoye-yonelik-operasyonlarda-49-supheli-yakalandi/3660992. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Anadolu Ajansı. (2025, 10 September). FETÖ’ye yönelik operasyonlarda yakalanan 40 şüpheli tutuklandı. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/fetoye-yonelik-operasyonlarda-yakalanan-40-supheli-tutuklandi/3683243. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Anadolu Ajansı. (2025, 16 September). FETÖ’nün Dışişleri Bakanlığı mahrem yapılanmasına yönelik soruşturmada 15 gözaltı kararı. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/fetonun-disisleri-bakanligi-mahrem-yapilanmasina-yonelik-sorusturmada-15-gozalti-karari/3688724. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Diken. (2025, 30 September). 16 ilde FETÖ operasyonu: 35 kişi gözaltında. URL: https://www.diken.com.tr/16-ilde-feto-operasyonu-35-kisi-gozaltinda/. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Anadolu Ajansı. (2025, 3 October). FETÖ’ye yönelik operasyonlarda yakalanan 64 şüpheli tutuklandı. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/fetoye-yonelik-operasyonlarda-yakalanan-64-supheli-tutuklandi/3706238. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Anadolu Ajansı. (2025, 28 October). İstanbul merkezli 11 ilde FETÖ/PDY operasyonunda 22 zanlı yakalandı. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/istanbul-merkezli-11-ilde-feto-pdy-operasyonunda-22-zanli-yakalandi/3728439. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

T24. (2025, 31 October). Garson kod adlı gizli tanıktan çıkan verilerden 11 ilde FETÖ operasyonu: 10 şüpheli tutuklandı. URL: https://t24.com.tr/gundem/garson-kod-adli-gizli-taniktan-cikan-verilerden-11-ilde-feto-operasyonu-10-supheli-tutuklandi%2C1272092. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı. (2025, 17 November). İstanbul merkezli 27 ilde FETÖ’ye yönelik operasyonlar düzenlendi. URL: https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/istanbul-merkezli-27-ilde-fetoye-yonelik-operasyonlar-duzenlendi. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Anadolu Ajansı. (2025, 17 November). İstanbul merkezli 27 ilde FETÖ’ye yönelik operasyonlarda 71 şüpheli yakalandı. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/istanbul-merkezli-27-ilde-fetoye-yonelik-operasyonlarda-71-supheli-yakalandi-/3745608. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Anadolu Ajansı. (2025, 18 November). FETÖ’nün Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanlığındaki mahrem yapılanması soruşturmasında 22 gözaltı kararı. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/fetonun-kara-kuvvetleri-komutanligindaki-mahrem-yapilanmasi-sorusturmasinda-22-gozalti-karari/3746572. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

TRT Haber. (2025, 9 December). 6 ilde FETÖ’nün finans yapılanmasına operasyon: 13 gözaltı kararı. URL: https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/6-ilde-fetonun-finans-yapilanmasina-operasyon-13-gozalti-karari-928172.html. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Anadolu Ajansı. (2025, 17 December). FETÖ’ye yönelik son iki haftada düzenlenen operasyonlarda yakalanan 90 şüpheli tutuklandı. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/fetoye-yonelik-son-iki-haftada-duzenlenen-operasyonlarda-yakalanan-90-supheli-tutuklandi/3773274. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

TRT Haber. (2025, 21 December). 28 ilde FETÖ operasyonu: 50 tutuklama. URL: https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/28-ilde-feto-operasyonu-50-tutuklama-929269.html. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Anadolu Ajansı. (2025, 21 December). FETÖ’ye yönelik 28 ilde düzenlenen operasyonlarda 76 şüpheli yakalandı. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/fetoye-yonelik-28-ilde-duzenlenen-operasyonlarda-76-supheli-yakalandi/3776932. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Anadolu Ajansı. (2025, 25 December). FETÖ’nün “kamu mahrem yapılanması”na yönelik soruşturmada 20 şüpheli hakkında gözaltı kararı. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/fetonun-kamu-mahrem-yapilanmasina-yonelik-sorusturmada-20-supheli-hakkinda-gozalti-karari/3780323. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

Demirören Haber Ajansı. (2025, 25 December). FETÖ/PDY’nin kamu mahrem yapılanmasına yönelik 20 gözaltı kararı. URL: https://www.dha.com.tr/gundem/feto-pdynin-kamu-mahrem-yapilanmasina-yonelik-20-gozalti-karari-2783961. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

4. Image Credits

Human Rights Defenders e.V. (2026). Figures 1 to 21 for the 2025 Annual Report. Image files embedded via: https://humanrights-ev.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/. Accessed: 15.06.2026.

World Human Rights Defenders e.V. Berlin Participated in an International Conference on Hate Speech and Hate Crime

International Conference on Hate Speech

Human Rights Defenders e.V. Berlin participated in the international conference on hate speech and hate crime held in Limerick, Ireland, on 28–29 May.

The conference was organized by the Centre for the Study of Hate at the University of Limerick in close cooperation with the Council of Europe’s Steering Committee on Anti-Discrimination, Diversity and Inclusion (CDADI). The event brought together academics, policymakers, legal practitioners, civil society representatives, and human rights experts from across Europe.

The opening address was delivered by Professor Shane Kilcommins, President of the University of Limerick, while the closing session was led by Professor Jennifer Schweppe, one of the leading scholars in the field of hate crime research. Matteo Tracchi from the Council of Europe’s Hate Speech and Hate Crime Unit also contributed to the closing discussions.

Particular attention was drawn to three presentations addressing the consequences of state-driven stigmatization, hate speech, and discrimination in Türkiye from complementary perspectives.

Professor Hüseyin Demir presented “State-Driven Stigmatization as Hate Speech: Implications for European Human Rights Law and Strategic Litigation.” His research examined how systematic state-led stigmatization may constitute a structural human rights issue under the European Convention on Human Rights and highlighted the legal implications of discriminatory narratives and practices.

Journalist and researcher Kerim Balcı presented “Cross-border Impacts of Hate Speech and Hate Crime: How to Mitigate Harm Emanating from Another Jurisdiction.” His presentation focused on the transnational consequences of hate speech, including its impact on asylum procedures, international protection mechanisms, and the experiences of diaspora communities.

Associate Professor Fikret Demirçivi presented “Crafting the Undeserving Victim: Hate Speech and Narrative Warfare in State Repression.” His work analyzed how state-sponsored narratives can delegitimize targeted groups and shape public perceptions in ways that facilitate discrimination and exclusion.

Taken together, these presentations demonstrated how hate speech, stigmatization, and discrimination can operate not only as isolated violations but also as interconnected structural phenomena with significant implications for human rights protection, democratic governance, and the rule of law.

The conference also provided an important platform for dialogue and cooperation among scholars, civil society organizations, and international institutions working to combat hate speech, hate crime, and discrimination.

Human Rights Defenders e.V. Berlin remains committed to supporting initiatives that promote human dignity, fundamental rights, democratic values, and the protection of vulnerable communities. We will continue to engage with international partners and contribute to efforts aimed at preventing discrimination and advancing human rights across Europe.

#HumanRightsDefenders #HRDBerlin #HumanRights #HateSpeech #HateCrime #CouncilOfEurope #CDADI #HumanRightsLaw #RuleOfLaw #Democracy #CivilSociety

Delayed Justice: Our Major Legal Victory in the Gökhan Açıkkollu Case!

Gokhan acikkollu

Our legal struggle has yielded a historic result! Following the United Nations, the Constitutional Court of Turkey (AYM) has also ruled that the state is directly responsible for the death of teacher Gökhan Açıkkollu, who lost his life under torture. Though delayed, justice has prevailed, marking a massive milestone in our fight against torture and impunity.

The Constitutional Court (AYM) has signed a historic violation decision, ruling that the state is directly responsible for the death of teacher Gökhan Açıkkollu, who lost his life in police custody in 2016. Coming nearly a decade after the incident, this decision is the most tangible fruit of our determined struggle as the Association of Human Rights Defenders (HRD) on the international stage.

The Process Behind Our Success: HRD’s UN Initiative

During that dark period when domestic remedies were deliberately prolonged and left ineffective, we took the initiative as the Association of Human Rights Defenders (HRD) and the International Association for Human Rights Advocacy in Geneva (IAHRA).

On January 29, 2020, we applied directly to the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee on behalf of Gökhan Açıkkollu’s family.

Rejecting the government’s defense that “domestic remedies had not been exhausted,” the UN Human Rights Committee issued a severe violation ruling against Turkey on October 25, 2022. The UN certified that the state failed to protect Açıkkollu from torture and death. Today’s AYM decision is a direct result of this international success and the pressure generated by our association (HRD) at the UN!

The Importance of the AYM Decision: Violation in Two Dimensions

Although the AYM delayed the process with judicial passivity years after the UN Committee’s decision, it ultimately had to accept the truth. This decision is the FIRST ruling by the AYM regarding the post-July 15 period where both the right to life and the prohibition of ill-treatment were violated in both substantive and procedural dimensions.

The AYM identified two critical dimensions of violation:

  • Substantive Dimension (Direct Responsibility): Examining the chronological medical reports, bruising, and psychological trauma, the AYM ruled that the state is directly responsible for the physical and psychological violence that led to Açıkkollu’s death. The state failed its absolute duty to protect an individual under its custody.

  • Procedural Dimension (Inadequate Investigation): Criticizing the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office’s non-prosecution decisions aimed at covering up the incident, the AYM certified that the investigation was superficial, camera footage was neglected, and torture allegations were ignored.

13 Days Under Torture: We Have Not Forgotten

Teacher Gökhan Açıkkollu was detained from his home on July 23, 2016, under heavy and baseless allegations. Despite suffering from panic attacks and diabetes, he was subjected to severe beatings, insults, and physical violence for 13 days in the Istanbul Police Department custody.

Although doctors noted in medical reports that “he has been subjected to severe insults and swearing in custody for 6 days,” and a cellmate stated, “They beat him to death, at least 15 people witnessed it,” judicial authorities tried to shelve the case for years. Forensic reports later revealed that his fatal heart attack was triggered by the extreme stress of detention conditions.

What is Next? Perpetrators Will Be Held Accountable!

This decision is not an end for us, but the beginning of a new legal battle. We will not allow cosmetic legal procedures!

  • The police officers who directly beat and assaulted him in custody,

  • The police chiefs who coordinated the interrogation process,

  • The medical personnel who refrained from recording visible lesions in official reports,

  • The prosecutors of the period who paved the legal ground for this unlawful process by issuing non-prosecution decisions…

We will not take a single step back: There is no statute of limitations for torture and crimes against humanity. As HRD, we will follow this case until every single public official who perpetrated or condoned this severe violation is identified and held accountable before the law!

“Justice is the foundation of the state; justice served, even if late, is the guarantee of brighter days ahead.”

Gökhan Açıkkollu Human Rights
Gökhan Açıkkollu Human Rights

Gökhan Açıkkollu’s Detention Process

Gökhan Açıkkollu, who worked as a teacher in a public school, was detained at his home on July 23, 2016, at around 11:00 PM, upon the instruction of Public Prosecutor Can Tuncay by a police team of 15 people. The detention period was specified as thirty days in the ruling. The accusations leveled against Açıkkollu were the heaviest offenses under the Turkish Penal Code, including membership in an armed organization, attempting to partially overthrow the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) or attempting to prevent it from partially or completely performing its duties by using force and violence, attempting to overthrow the Government of the Republic of Turkey or preventing it from partially or completely performing its duties by using force and violence, and inciting the public to an armed uprising against the Government of the Republic of Turkey.

Subjected to Severe Insults and Swearing in Custody for Six Days

Despite suffering from panic attacks and diabetes, Açıkkollu was subjected to severe beatings, insults, and physical violence during the 13 days he spent in the detention center of the Istanbul Police Department. Ecchymosis, bruising, swelling, hyperemia, and traumatic lesions that formed on his body during this period were recorded chronologically in forensic medical examination reports. Açıkkollu also described what he experienced to the examining doctors during his detention, and the doctors wrote down his statements exactly as: “He stated that he has been subjected to severe insults and swearing in custody for 6 days.”

Death Following a Detention Period Extended for the Third Time Under Torture!

Açıkkollu’s detention period was extended for the third time on August 4, 2016, by prosecutor Can Tuncay. Just one day after this extension, in the early hours of August 5, 2016, he collapsed in his cell and lost his life in the hospital where he was taken.

“They Beat Gökhan Açıkkollu to Death!”

A cellmate who was detained together with him stated in a petition submitted to the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office on September 20, 2016:

“We stayed together with Gökhan Açıkkollu. He was beaten to death while in custody. At least 15 people witnessed this situation.”

The Legal Process Following Açıkkollu’s Decease

Following Açıkkollu’s passing, the investigation launched by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office resulted in a first decision of non-prosecution on December 20, 2016. Upon the request of Açıkkollu’s lawyer, a report was prepared by the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (TIHV) on January 18, 2017. The report explicitly stated that the signs of battery on Açıkkollu’s body and the psychological stress he experienced were clearly within the scope of torture in medical literature. His wife objected to the non-prosecution decision along with this medical report, and the criminal judgeship of peace evaluating the objection overturned the prosecutor’s decision after a 7-month delay. However, following an additional investigation, the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office issued a decision of non-prosecution once again, which was served to his wife on May 11, 2020. His wife applied to the Constitutional Court (AYM) on June 16, 2020 (within the scope of the legal time extension due to the pandemic), and this long process finally culminated in the AYM’s violation judgment dated July 30, 2025.

Press Release Regarding the Discrimination and Marginalization in the Tragic Event in Kahramanmaraş

We strongly condemn the practices of marginalization and hatred directed at the cherished memory of our late child Yusuf Tarık Gül, who lost his life in the tragic event in Kahramanmaraş, and his grieving family, solely on the grounds that his father is a “KHK” victim (dismissed by Statutory Decree).

We feel profound shame on behalf of humanity to witness yet another cruel and typical example of this profiling mentality, which is being systematically perpetuated across generations.

The extent of this discrimination is glaringly evident in the documents reflected in the press, which are understood to belong to official institutions:

  • Due to his family being profiled as KHK victims, the name of our deceased child was placed in parentheses on official lists, unlike the other victims.

  • While high-level state protocol attended all other funerals, as clearly seen in the published burial lists, no protocol attendance was shown for the funeral of Yusuf Tarık Gül.

  • His name was not even mentioned during the mass funeral ceremony.

  • His respected, grieving father was not even permitted to cry out his agony; rather, attempts were made to silence him by physically covering his mouth.

It is impossible for us to accept this unending grudge and hatred that discriminates even among our innocent children—who are all victims of the same tragedy and the exact same pain—marginalizing a child even on his final journey.

As World Human Rights Defenders – Berlin, we once again vehemently condemn this language of hate and profiling policies that began with unlawful decrees and have now extended to relatives, the deceased, innocent children, and even future generations. We denounce the dark intent behind these actions. With a longing for a world that respects democracy, the rule of law, and human rights—particularly in Turkey—we wish God’s mercy upon all our children who lost their lives in this tragic event, fortitude and patience to the grieving families, and offer our deepest condolences to our nation.

Kahramanmaraş’taki okul saldırısında hayattan koparılan 9 canımızın isimleri:
— Öğretmen Ayla Kara
— Adnan Göktürk Yeşil
— Furkan Sancak Balal
— Belinay Nur Boyraz
— Kerem Erdem Güngör
— Zeynep Kılıç
— Bayram Nabi Şişik
— Şuranur Sevgi Kazıcı
— Yusuf Tarık Gül