SUBMISSION: ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION

You can download this report pdf here: HRD_BERLIN_Enforced disappearance_Report

SUBMISSION: ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION

 

To: Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED) and Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID)

 

Date: November 2025

 

Submitting organisation

Human Rights Defenders e.V. (HRD) Berlin, Germany

HRD e.V. is a non profit association based in Berlin that documents human rights violations, provides legal support to victims, and engages with regional and international mechanisms with a special focus on violations by the Republic of Türkiye.

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This submission documents a state run campaign of transnational repression and enforced disappearance carried out by the Republic of Türkiye since the attempted coup of July 2016, primarily targeting alleged members of the Gülen Movement abroad. Official statements by former Vice President Fuat Oktay and Justice Minister Yılmaz Tunç describe the return of 131 individuals to Türkiye (official statement) [1] from abroad as part of what they call intelligence diplomacy, with most cases reportedly carried out via deportation rather than formal extradition.[2] [3] The National Intelligence Organization’s 2024 activity report likewise notes operations to bring persons from abroad to Türkiye. [4]  Drawing on case studies from Europe, Africa and Asia, the report shows that these practices amount to a widespread and systematic attack on a civilian population and therefore meet the threshold of crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.

RESPONSES TO GUIDING QUESTIONS

1.    How do enforced disappearances occur in the context of transnational repression, and which individuals are most at risk?

Enforced disappearances perpetrated by Türkiye are not singular events but the culmination of a sophisticated, multi-stage strategy of “Administrative Strangulation” designed to strip victims of legal personhood before physical abduction.

A.  The “Administrative Trap”: Weaponization of Consular Powers

The Turkish state systematically abuses consular powers to strip its citizens of passports and protection abroad. By arbitrarily cancelling 234,419 passports,[5]  it turns dissidents into de facto stateless persons, giving host countries a pretext to detain them for alleged immigration violations and to transfer them to Turkish intelligence without any judicial oversight.

In Azerbaijan, Taci Şentürk was detained after Türkiye invalidated his passport and was handed directly to MİT despite his asylum request and without any extradition procedure. [6] In Cambodia, the Turkish Embassy falsely claimed that Osman Karaca’s valid Mexican passport was fake, leading to his detention and unlawful transfer to Türkiye despite the intervention of the Mexican Embassy. [7] In Malaysia, police told educator Arif Komiş that Türkiye had cancelled his passport and used this alone to detain him and deport him rapidly to Türkiye.[8]

B.    The Modus Operandi of Physical Abduction and Rendition Flights

Once the legal shield is removed, abductions follow a paramilitary script that combines violent seizure, chemical sedation and discreet flights.

In Malaysia, Alettin Duman was forced into a car at gunpoint and drugged into unconsciousness before handover to Turkish officials.[9] During transfer from Pakistan, Mesut Kaçmaz was beaten while agents threatened to rape his wife and daughters.[10] In Malaysia, Tamer Tıbık was chained by neck, hands and ankles in a remote area before being flown to Türkiye.[11]

Renditions frequently use private jets registered to front companies or chartered for the operation. In Kosovo, six teachers abducted on 31 March 2018 were flown out on a Bombardier Challenger with tail number TC KLE before courts could intervene.[12] In Moldova, seven teachers were taken straight to a chartered aircraft waiting at Chisinau Airport.[13] In Gabon, three educators and their families, thirteen people in total, were placed on a special flight arranged by Turkish intelligence after detention on fabricated charges.[14]

C.   Individuals Most at Risk

The pattern shows a broad campaign that targets not only political opponents but anyone linked by work, business, advocacy or family ties to groups labeled hostile.

1.   Educators and volunteers in affiliated institutions

Teachers and school managers in Gülen linked schools and NGOs are primary targets, as seen in the abductions of seven teachers in Moldova, six in Kosovo and the attempt against school director Veysel Akçay in Mongolia. [15]

2.   Employees of commercial entities and their families

Business people are pursued for lawful trade or alleged donations, such as Sudan based businessman Memduh Çıkmaz, [16] Azerbaijan Georgia based businessman Mustafa Ceyhan [17] who was taken from a courthouse, and Malaysian businessman Tamer Tıbık, [18] targeted for his role in a business association.

3.   Human rights defenders and reporting bodies

Staff and volunteers of groups that document abuses, including Advocates of Silenced Turkey (AST) and the Stockholm Center for Freedom (SCF), face surveillance, intimidation and the risk of abduction for exposing transnational repression. [19]

4.   UN protected asylum seekers

People under UNHCR protection are seized to show that no international status is respected, such as Zabit Kişi and Enver Kılıç taken from Kazakhstan [20]and Selahaddin Gülen abducted in Kenya despite registered asylum claims [21]

5.   Family members as collective punishment

Spouses and children are used as leverage, as with the Kaçmaz family in Pakista [22] and the seven Turkish nationals seized in Kenya on 18 October 2024, where relatives were detained solely because of family links. [23]

2. Which national, regional, or international laws, practices, or (bilateral) agreements contribute to or prevent such acts?

Türkiye uses a hybrid repression strategy that exploits gaps between criminal law, migration and security cooperation. Instead of formal extradition with judicial review, it pushes host states toward administrative deportation, informal intelligence handover and politically driven exceptions to human rights norms.

A.  Weaponization of “Counter-Terrorism” Cooperation (The Conceptual Mask)

By branding the Gülen Movement as a terrorist organisation, Türkiye asks partners to treat teachers, businesspeople and activists as security threats rather than ordinary suspects. In Indonesia, for example, a list of names supplied by Ankara led to the detention and deportation of businessman Mustafa Kenel [24] and others without any court based extradition procedure. In Kosovo, six teachers were seized under the label of security risk even though a later parliamentary inquiry found no evidence they threatened Kosovo itself. [25]

B.  The “Immigration Law” Loophole (Bypassing Judicial Extradition)

When courts reject extradition for lack of evidence, Türkiye turns to migration rules. In Bulgaria, a court blocked the extradition of businessman Abdullah Büyük [26] as politically motivated, yet he was later detained for alleged lack of valid documents and administratively pushed across the border into Turkish custody. In Malaysia, teacher and asylum seeker Arif Komiş [27] was treated as an illegal migrant after Ankara cancelled his passport and was deported directly to Türkiye in violation of the non refoulement principle.

C.   Abuse of International Mechanisms (INTERPOL and Consular Notices)

International mechanisms are turned into instruments of persecution. In Azerbaijan, educator Taci Şentürk [28] was detained solely on the basis of an Interpol related notification that his passport was invalid, then handed to Turkish agents the next day. In Cambodia, the Turkish Embassy falsely claimed that Osman Karaca [29] held a fake Mexican passport, triggering his detention even though the Mexican Embassy confirmed its validity, creating the window for his transfer to Turkish intelligence.

D.   Transactional Diplomacy and “State-Sponsored Bribery”

In states with weak rule of law, renditions are secured through money and political bargains. Turkish security expert Burak Darıcılı [30] has publicly stated that many abductions abroad are enabled by bribes. In Switzerland, prosecutors uncovered a plot by two Turkish diplomats[31] [32](Press Attaché H.M.G. and Second Secretary H.K.Y.) to drug and kidnap a Swiss Turkish businessman, including offers of money to an associate, showing that criminal methods are used as tools of foreign policy. The detention of educator Mustafa Emre Çabuk [33] in Georgia immediately after a high level Turkish visit suggests similar quid pro quo dynamics.

E.  Co-opting Local Security Apparatuses (The “Deep State” Collaboration)

Operations often bypass the host country judiciary and even elected leaders through direct intelligence to intelligence channels. In Kosovo, Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj stated he had not been informed about the abduction of six teachers. The operation had been arranged between MİT and the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, leading later to the dismissal of the KIA Director and the Interior Minister and confirming an unauthorised foreign intervention executed with local partners.[34]

F.  Abuse of International Funding and “Civil Society” Proxies (The Financial Mask)

Pro government think tanks and religious structures function as surveillance and profiling tools, sometimes financed by European funds. The SETA think tank published a report blacklisting journalists at outlets such as

BBC, Deutsche Welle and Voice of America as extensions of terrorist organisations, while linked entities were shown in European Parliament questions to have received EU grants under civil society and education programmes. In Germany, imams paid by the Turkish state through DİTİB were found to have collected information on dissidents and reported it to Ankara under the cover of religious and integration work.[35] [36] [37]

1. Intelligence Leakage and the Fragility of Asylum in Neighboring States (The Greece Case) In Greece and other neighbouring countries, repression takes the form of data leakage [38] [39] surveillance and pressure on asylum seekers. Victims report that confidential asylum files have been shared with Turkish authorities, turning protection procedures into sources of intelligence. Pro government media in Türkiye have published photos of high ranking dissidents living in Greece, while Turkish court files refer to information obtained in cooperation with Greek services.

The Acar Family case illustrates the specific risk for human rights defenders. While recognised as asylum seekers in Greece, the family launched the HumanPins project to map violations in Türkiye and then faced systematic surveillance and harassment on Greek soil. After a direct attack on their home and insufficient protection despite a police (Report No: EA-32400, dated 18 April 2023 [40]), they were forced to flee again, this time to Germany, becoming victims of secondary displacement created by transnational repression within the European Union.[41]

3.    Which mechanisms exist or are lacking to ensure investigation, prosecution, and mutual legal assistance?

A.  Systemic Impunity in the Source State (Türkiye)

Inside Türkiye, allegations of enforced disappearance are almost never investigated effectively. Prosecutors routinely close files, as in the case of Mustafa Yilmaz, abducted in Ankara on 19 February 2019, despite contradictions in camera footage and phone data submitted by his family. [42] State of Emergency Decree Laws (specifically Decree No. 667, Article 9 and Decree No. 668, Article 37) grant functional immunity to officials acting in the name of counter terrorism, which in practice shields intelligence officers from liability.[43] The Constitutional Court has also rejected applications such as that of Yusuf Bilge Tunc, missing since 6 August 2019, by accepting official denials and using procedural grounds to avoid examining the facts.[44]

B.  Accountability in Host States: Breaking the Cycle of Impunity

Some host states have shown that domestic institutions can investigate and punish cooperation with unlawful renditions. In Kosovo, the abduction of six Turkish educators (Mustafa Erdem, Yusuf Karabina, Kahraman Demirez, Cihan Özkan, Hasan Hüseyin Günakan, and Osman Karakaya) in March 2018 led the Prime Minister to dismiss the Interior Minister and the intelligence chief, a parliamentary inquiry [45] to find that the deportations violated many constitutional provisions, and the conviction of former intelligence director Driton Gashi [46] for abuse of office, with a prison sentence of four years and eight months.[47]  In Moldova,[48] the seizure of seven teachers from the Orizont schools in September 2018 resulted, after a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, in a public apology by the Prosecutor General and the criminal conviction of former security chief Vasile Botnari, who was ordered to pay the compensation awarded by the Court.[49]

C.   The Switzerland model preventive criminal investigation

Switzerland illustrates preventive accountability, where an attempted rendition triggered a criminal case before any disappearance occurred. In 2018, the Federal Intelligence Service uncovered a plan by two Turkish diplomats in Bern to drug and abduct a Swiss Turkish businessman.[50] The Office of the Attorney General opened proceedings for political espionage and acts on behalf of a foreign state, and the Federal Council authorised prosecution, forcing Türkiye to recall the diplomats and sending a clear deterrent signal against future operations on Swiss territory.[51]

4.    Which measures should States adopt to ensure effective protection, truth, justice, and reparation?

A.  Legislative Measures: Closing the “Intelligence Loophole”

States should criminalise any unauthorised cooperation of local officials with foreign intelligence for surveillance, arrest or handover, and exclude the defence of superior orders. The conviction of Kosovo intelligence chief Driton Gashi [52] and the work of the Kosovo parliamentary inquiry offer concrete models for such criminal and parliamentary control.[53]

B.  Procedural Safeguards: The “Airport to Court” Custody Chain

Law should require that any foreign national detained for deportation has immediate in person access to a lawyer and UNHCR, and that deportations based on cancelled passports or security lists are automatically reviewed by a court with suspensive effect. The Mongolian authorities blocking the departure of the plane that was to take Veysel Akcay [54] shows how firm border control can physically stop an abduction.[55]

C.   Judicial Measures: Categorical Rejection of “Diplomatic Assurances”

Courts must treat transfers to Turkiye as carrying a serious risk of torture, in light of cases such as Orhan Inandi [56]  whose broken arm was shown in state media after weeks incommunicado, and the secret detention of Ayten Ozturk [57] and Zabit Kisi [58]. They should refuse diplomatic assurances that contradict this pattern and use universal jurisdiction to investigate officials involved, drawing on evidence already submitted to the International Criminal Court (ICC).[59]

D.   Truth and Reparation: Addressing “Layered Opacity”

Because enforced disappearance is a continuing violation, states must guarantee truth, status repair, compensation and rehabilitation. Independent bodies should review past abductions, declassify flight and airport records, and proactively inform families about the fate and whereabouts of victims. Reparation should restore or upgrade the residence and citizenship status of relatives so they are not forced into secondary displacement. Law should allow public apologies and civil claims for damages against both the state and responsible officials. Families especially children who witnessed violent arrests such as in the Kacmaz case must receive long term medical and psychosocial support.

5.      How can international organizations strengthen safeguards?

International organizations, especially INTERPOL, have at times become enablers of Turkeys transnational repression through misuse of Red Notices and the stolen and lost travel documents database. Alerts that should serve ordinary criminal justice instead trigger arrests that open the door to informal rendition, as seen in the cases of Taci Senturk in Azerbaijan, Enver Kilic in Kazakhstan and Arif Komiş in Malaysia, where passport alerts were used to justify detention and handover to Turkish agents rather than proper extradition review.

To strengthen safeguards, international bodies should:

1. Link access to INTERPOL systems to respect for human rights decisions, with the option to suspend or restrict states that systematically ignore regional court rulings (European Court of Human Rights) and UN opinions on arbitrary detention and unlawful transfers.
2. Automatically delete data and block new requests when such bodies find that a persons detention or transfer is political or unlawful, and trigger an audit of the national office that filed the
3. Speed up and make more transparent the work of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL Files, so people at risk get rapid remedies and the scale of abusive notices is publicly visible.
4. Apply strict verification to lost or stolen passport entries concerning dissidents, exiles and asylum seekers, so migration control databases cannot be used as a substitute for political persecution.

6.    Are there positive examples of domestic or international cooperation that have effectively prevented or addressed enforced disappearances in a transnational context?

A.  Post-Facto Accountability: The Kosovo Precedent

In Kosovo, six Turkish educators were abducted and secretly flown out of the country. The prime minister publicly condemned the operation as a violation of sovereignty, dismissed the minister of interior and the intelligence chief, and a parliamentary inquiry documented the abuses.[60] The special prosecution then secured a conviction against former intelligence director Driton Gashi for abuse of office, showing that political, parliamentary and judicial accountability can reach those who cooperate with foreign renditions.[61]

B.  -Emptive Prevention via Counter-Intelligence: The Switzerland Case

In Switzerland, the federal intelligence service uncovered a plan by two Turkish diplomats to abduct a Swiss Turkish businessman using drugs. The attorney general opened a criminal case for political espionage and prohibited acts on behalf of a foreign state, and the federal council authorised prosecution. Faced with possible arrest, Türkiye recalled the diplomats. This demonstrates how early counter intelligence work and readiness to prosecute even diplomats can stop an abduction before it happens.[62]

C.  Sovereign Resistance and Civil Society: The Mongolia Case

In Mongolia, educator Veysel Akcay was seized and brought to the airport where a Turkish jet was waiting. After rapid mobilisation by family, colleagues, media and members of parliament, the Mongolian authorities refused flight clearance. The standoff ended with Akcay being released to local police. Strict control of airspace and public scrutiny proved to be an immediate and effective barrier to rendition.[63]

D.  Judicial Non-Refoulement: The Italian Judiciary

Italian courts have repeatedly rejected extradition requests for Turkish nationals accused of links to the Gulen movement, finding a real risk of torture, unfair trial and persecution in Türkiye. By strictly applying the non refoulement principle and European human rights standards, the Italian judiciary has provided a clear example of how courts can block transnational repression through law based decisions.[64]

CONCLUSION: A STATE-SPONSORED CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY

The evidence shows that enforced disappearances carried out by the Republic of Türkiye are not isolated excesses but a deliberate and organised state policy. Former Vice President Fuat Oktay’s statement to Parliament that more than one hundred people were “brought back” through intelligence operations, and official figures confirming over one hundred twenty renditions, demonstrate a coordinated campaign against a civilian population, in particular persons associated with the Gulen movement, that fits the definition of crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.

Abduction and torture are structurally linked in this policy. Cases such as Orhan Inandi and Zabit Kisi show a clear pattern of incommunicado detention, black sites, and severe physical and psychological torture rather than isolated misconduct. Inside Türkiye, investigations into disappearances routinely end in non prosecution decisions. The case of Yusuf Bilge Tunc, missing since 2019 despite strong evidence of abduction, illustrates a domestic system that protects perpetrators instead of victims.

Externally, Türkiye’s practice erodes core norms of international cooperation. Interpol tools and consular channels are misused to detain dissidents abroad, as seen in the cases of Taci Senturk and Osman Karaca. When host states like Kosovo and Moldova assist renditions in defiance of their own courts, the principle of non refoulement and the integrity of asylum systems are directly undermined.

For these reasons, We urge the Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED) and the Working Group (WGEID) to recognize that the Republic of Türkiye has institutionalized enforced disappearance as a tool of transnational repression. This is a regime that:

• Surveils and Profiles asylum seekers on sovereign foreign soil, utilizing diplomatic missions and proxies to compile “target lists” in violation of host nation laws and diplomatic [65] [66]
• Abducts its own citizens from foreign soil using private jets registered to front companies.[67]
• Tortures them in secret
• Parades them on state television as

The international community must move beyond “expressions of concern.” It is time to treat these acts for what they are: State-Sponsored Kidnapping. We call for the immediate application of universal jurisdiction by member states to hold the architects of this policy accountable, and for the implementation of strict “rule of law” conditionalities for Türkiye’s access to international police cooperation mechanisms.

The Cycle of Impunity: The ease with which Türkiye conducts these operations ranging from physical abductions to the abuse of EU funds for espionage is a direct consequence of international impunity. Because the regime has faced no tangible sanctions for its previous violations (such as the abduction of teachers from Kosovo or the torture of Orhan İnandı), it has been emboldened to expand its transnational repression toolkit. It now fearlessly weaponizes “security cooperation” and “civil society funding” to persecute innocent individuals and their families abroad. Without a robust cost-imposition strategy by the international community, this state-sponsored lawlessness will only escalate.

[1] https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/adalet-bakani-tunc-15-temmuzda-son-darbeyi-vuracaklarini-zannettiler-basaramadilar/

[2] Republic of Türkiye Presidency, Strategy and Budget Directorate (SBB), “Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı Başkanlığı” (TBMM Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonu görüşmesi), 25 November 2022, www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Milli-Istihbarat-Teskilati-Baskanligi.pdf

[3] Anadolu Ajansı, “Bakan Tunç darbe girişimi gecesini ve FETÖyle mücadeleyi AA’ya anlattı,” 13 July 2023, www.aa.com.tr/tr/15-temmuz-darbe-girisimi/bakan-tunc-darbe-girisimi-gecesini-ve-fetoyle-mucadeleyi-aaya-anlatti/2944560

[4] T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Millî İstihbarat Teşkilâtı Başkanlığı, “2024 Faaliyet Raporu,” Ankara, 2025, www.mit.gov.tr/uploads/f/XCmPRwiG9MzB.pdf

[5] Advocates of Silenced Turkey (AST), “Beyond Turkey’s Borders: Unveiling Global Purge, Transnational Repression, Abductions,” 26 May 2023.

[6] ECtHR, Şentürk and Others v. Azerbaijan, Application No. 41326/17, Judgment of 10 March 2022.

[7] UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD), Opinion No. 84/2020 concerning Osman Karaca (Cambodia and Turkey), 3 March 2021.

[8] UN WGAD, Opinion No. 51/2020 concerning Arif Komiş, Ülkü Komiş and four minors (Malaysia and Turkey), 2020.

[9] UN WGAD, Opinion No. 8/2022 concerning Alettin Duman and Tamer Tıbık (Malaysia and Turkey), 7 June 2022.

[10] UN WGAD, Opinion No. 11/2018 concerning Mesut Kaçmaz, Meral Kaçmaz and two minors (Pakistan and Turkey), 25 May 2018.

[11] Advocates of Silenced Turkey (AST), “Erdogan’s Long Arms: Abductions In Turkey And Abroad,” September 2020, p. 64.

[12] Correctiv, “Black Sites Turkey,” 11 December 2018. (Investigative report identifying the jet TC-KLE).

[13] “7 Turkish educators abducted in Moldova sent to Turkey,” 8 September 2018. (See also: Amnesty International, “Moldova: Seven People Deported to Turkey despite Major Human Rights Concerns,” 6 Sept. 2018).

[14] Advocates of Silenced Turkey (AST), “Erdogan’s Long Arms: Abductions In Turkey And Abroad,” September 2020, p. 138.

[15] Advocates of Silenced Turkey (AST), “Global Purge: 144 Abductions Conducted By The Turkish Government In Turkey And Abroad,” 23 June 2021.

[16] Advocates of Silenced Turkey (AST), “Erdogan’s Long Arms: Abductions In Turkey And Abroad,” September 2020, p. 29

[17] Advocates of Silenced Turkey (AST), “Erdogan’s Long Arms: Abductions In Turkey And Abroad,” September 2020, p. 49

[18] Advocates of Silenced Turkey (AST), “Erdogan’s Long Arms: Abductions In Turkey And Abroad,” September 2020, p. 66

[19] Advocates of Silenced Turkey (AST), “Beyond Turkey’s Borders: Unveiling Global Purge, Transnational Repression, Abductions,” 26 May 2023.

[20] Advocates of Silenced Turkey (AST), “Global Purge: 144 Abductions Conducted By The Turkish Government In Turkey And Abroad,” 23 June 2021

[21] Human Rights Watch, “We Will Find You”: A Global Look at How Governments Repress Nationals Abroad, 22 February 2024.

[22] “Pakistan government deports abducted Kaçmaz Family to Turkey”, Stockholm Center for

Freedom, 14 Oct. 2017, stockholmcf.org/pakistan-government-deports-abducted-kacmaz-family-to-turkey

[23] BBC News, “British national and several Turkish citizens abducted in Kenya,” 19 October 2024.

[24] Stockholm Center for Freedom (SCF), “Indonesia deports Turkish businessman to Turkey over Erdoğan regime’s request,” 19 December 2017.

[25] Balkan Insight, “Kosovo Ex-Intelligence Chief Jailed for Deceiving State over Turks’ Deportation,” 19 July 2023.

[26] Sözcü Newspaper, “Abdullah Büyük’s extradition to Turkey has stirred up Bulgaria,” 12 August 2016.

[27] UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD), Opinion No. 51/2020 concerning Arif Komiş (Malaysia and Turkey), 2020.

[28] ECtHR, Shenturk and Others v. Azerbaijan, Application No. 41326/17, Judgment of 10 March 2022.

[29] TR724, “Mexican citizen Osman Karaca kidnapped, Mexican Foreign Affairs on the case,” 18 October 2019.

[30] ideo statement by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Burak Darıcılı on TVnet (Cited in ABDUCTIONS and ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES Report, p. 54).

[31] Human Rights Defenders e.V., “In Switzerland, Turkish diplomats tried to kidnap a man with MİT,” (Cited in ABDUCTIONS and ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES Report, p. 162).

[32] Reuters, “Swiss investigate alleged Turkish attempt to kidnap businessman”, 14 March 2018, erişim 24 January 2026.

[33] Zaman Australia, “Unlawful detention of educator Mustafa Emre Çabuk in Georgia,” 25 May 2017.

[34] Euronews, “Kosovo Prime Minister: I was not informed about the kidnapping of Turks,” 29 March 2018.

[35] European Parliament, Parliamentary Question E-002447/2019, “EU funding for the SETA Foundation,” 24 July 2019; See also: Der Spiegel, “Erdogan’s Lobbyists in Brussels,” 2019.

[36] Deutsche Welle, “German prosecutors raid Turkish imams’ homes in spy case,” 15 February 2017.

[37] BBC Switzerland investigates Turkey spying allegations. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39384219

[38] Nordic Monitor, “Turkish Spying Operation in Greece Revealed,” 16 November 2022. (This investigative report published secret Turkish government documents dated September 2, 2020, revealing that a police liaison officer at the Turkish Embassy in Athens conducted covert surveillance on asylum seekers, profiling 13 residents and 6 businesses in Athens and Thessaloniki).

[39] Middle East Forum (citing Nordic Monitor), “Turkey’s MIT Expands Secret Ops in Greece,” 12 April 2023. (Documentation of expanded espionage activities targeting members of the Gülen Movement in Greece, shared with police departments in 54 Turkish provinces)

[40] Hellenic Police (Elliniki Astynomia), Incident Report No. EA-32400, 18 April 2023.

[41] Asylum Information Database (AIDA), “Country Report: Greece 2023,” European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), June 2024. (Documenting systematic pushbacks and the precarious situation of Turkish asylum seekers, reinforcing the need for secondary movement)

[42] “Mustafa Yılmaz, missing for 9 months, found in TEM,” Evrensel, 22 October 2019.

[43] Decree Law No. 667 (23 July 2016), Article 9; Decree Law No. 668 (27 July 2016), Article 37.

[44] Constitutional Court of Türkiye, Nuray Tunç and Mustafa Tunç Application, App. No. 45801/19 (Regarding Yusuf Bilge Tunç).

[45] Balkan Insight, “Kosovo Ex-Intelligence Chief Jailed for Deceiving State over Turks’ Deportation,” 19 July 2023.

[46] Samanyolu Haber, “Important decision on kidnappings by National Intelligence Organisation: Jail for Kosovo’s former intelligence chief,” 19 July 2023. (Also cited in ABDUCTIONS and ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES Report, p. 16).

[47] Euronews, “Kosovo Prime Minister: I was not informed about the kidnapping of Turks,” 29 March 2018.

[48] TR724, “The Attorney General apologised in ‘Turkish’ in front of the cameras for the teachers kidnapped from Moldova,” 6 February 2020.

[49] Balkan Insight, “Moldova Ex-Spy Chief Fined for Expelling Turkish Teachers,” 9 September 2020.

[50] Human Rights Defenders e.V., “In Switzerland, Turkish diplomats tried to kidnap a man with MİT,” (Cited in ABDUCTIONS and ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES Report, p. 162).

[51] Reuters, “Swiss investigate alleged Turkish attempt to kidnap businessman,” 15 March 2018.

[52] Samanyolu Haber, “Important decision on kidnappings by National Intelligence Organisation: Jail for Kosovo’s former intelligence chief,” 19 July 2023.

[53] UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD), Opinion No. 47/2020 concerning Kahraman Demirez et al. (Turkey and Kosovo), 25 September 2020.

[54] BBC News, “Veysel Akcay: Mongolia blocks ‘abduction’ of Turkish teacher,” 27 July 2018.

[55] ECtHR, Ozdil and Others v. Moldova, Application No. 42305/18, Judgment of 11 June 2019

[56] Anadolu Agency (AA), “FETÖ’s Central Asia General Manager Orhan İnandı brought to Turkey,” 5 July 2021; TR724, “Torturers broke Orhan İnandı’s right arm in 3 places,” 7 August 2021.

[57] Bold Medya, “Ayten Öztürk, who was tortured for 6 months in the torture centre in Ankara, told everything,” 2 September 2023.

[58] Bold Medya, “Zabit Kişi told about 108 days of torture: I don’t find suicides strange anymore,” 2 November 2023.

[59] The Guardian, “ICC asked to investigate Turkish government over persecution of opponents around the world,” 1 March 2023.

[60] Euronews, “Kosovo Prime Minister: I was not informed about the kidnapping of Turks,” 29 March 2018. (Cited in ABDUCTIONS and ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES Report, p. 163, ).

[61] Samanyolu Haber, “Important decision on kidnappings by National Intelligence Organisation: Jail for Kosovo’s former intelligence chief,” 19 July 2023. (Cited in ABDUCTIONS and ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES Report, p. 164, ).

[62] Reuters, “Swiss investigate alleged Turkish attempt to kidnap businessman,” 15 March 2018. (See also: ABDUCTIONS and ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES Report, p. 161).

[63] BBC News, “Veysel Akcay: Mongolia blocks ‘abduction’ of Turkish teacher,” 27 July 2018. (See also: ABDUCTIONS and ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES Report, p. 167).

[64] ANSA, “Turkey: Italy rejects extradition of alleged Gulen supporter,” (General reference to Italian judicial practice in similar contexts).

[65] Nordic Monitor, “Turkish Spying Operation in Greece Revealed,” 16 November 2022 (Documenting the profiling of asylum seekers by embassy staff).

[66] Der Spiegel, “Erdogan’s Lobbyists in Brussels,” 2019 (Regarding SETA Foundation’s blacklisting reports funded by EU).

[67] Investigative Report on TC-KLE Tail Number. (See: ABDUCTIONS and ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES Report, p. 164)