Submission to the UN Human Rights Committee on Draft General Comment No. 38 (ICCPR Article 22)

You can Download this Report here: WHRD Input for General_Comment_No._38_on_Article_22

Submission to the UN Human Rights Committee on
Draft General Comment No. 38 (ICCPR Article 22)

 

World Human Rights Defenders e.V. (WHRD)

World Human Rights Defenders e.V. (WHRD) is a non-profit association working to defend human rights and support persecuted people around the world, with a special focus on Turkey.

WHRD e.V. prepares reports on human rights violations, establishes contacts with other human rights NGOs and advocacy groups, government agencies, and regional and international organizations. WHRD e.V. provides legal advice to affected persons, initiates legal proceedings on their behalf, and drafts official petitions and communications to the competent organs of the United Nations and to the relevant European institutions.

 

Email: [email protected]

Web: www.humanrights-ev.com

Address: Behrenstr. 29, 10117 Berlin, Germany

Registerblatt: VR 19921

EU Transparency Register Id: 5517551100955-15

 

 

 

Date:

December 2025

 

Executive Summary

World Human Rights Defenders e.V. submits this contribution to inform the Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of Article 22 ICCPR in the context of emergency and security frameworks. Drawing on documented patterns since July 2016 in Türkiye, the submission shows how emergency and post emergency measures can be used to dismantle associational life through mass closures, confiscation of assets, criminalisation of lawful membership and support, and long term administrative constraints that persist after the formal end of a state of emergency. It highlights the use of vague criteria such as alleged “connection” or “contact” to justify permanent dissolution of associations, foundations and trade unions without individualised judicial findings, and the conversion of previously lawful civic and union activities into indicators of criminal liability. The submission further describes how financial measures, including executive driven asset freezing and de banking effects, along with intrusive inspections, data collection, and restrictions on access to resources, contribute to a chilling effect and shrink civic space, including for diaspora based organisations. WHRD invites the Committee to affirm that extreme measures such as permanent dissolution and confiscation are compatible with Article 22 only under strict legality, necessity and proportionality conditions, ordered by an independent court with due process, and that States must not criminalise lawful associational activity or use emergency powers to restructure civil society beyond the exigencies of the situation. The submission concludes with targeted recommendations on judicial safeguards, limits on derogations, protection of access to resources, and removal of structural barriers affecting trade unions.

Sections: I Introduction, II Framework, III Emergency Interferences, IV Post Emergency Restrictions, V Trade Unions, VI Targeted Restrictions, VII Positive Obligations, VIII Key Findings, IX Recommendations

1. Introduction
2. World Human Rights Defenders e.V. respectfully submits this contribution in response to the Human Rights Committee’s call for input on Draft General Comment No. 38 concerning Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
3. This submission is based on an extensive review of reports and analyses issued by United Nations mechanisms, Council of Europe bodies, international and domestic non-governmental organisations, trade unions, professional associations, and academic experts. It focuses on developments in Türkiye following the attempted coup on 15 July 2016. It examines, in particular, the impact of emergency and post-emergency measures on the enjoyment of freedom of association.
4. In line with the Committee’s Concept Note, the submission addresses: (a) the applicable legal and normative framework; (b) the nature, scope and variety of interferences with freedom of association; (c) the interaction between derogations, ordinary restrictions and State positive obligations; and (d) broader trends in the shrinking of civic space and their implications for Article 22.
5. The examples and patterns described below are drawn from documented cases and systemic assessments. They are presented to inform the Committee’s interpretation of Article 22 and to illustrate how, if emergency and security frameworks are not tightly circumscribed, they can be used to dismantle associational life and civic space.

II. Legal and Normative Framework Applicable to Freedom of Association in Türkiye

5. Article 22 of the ICCPR guarantees to “everyone” the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions. This provision must be read together with Articles 2, 3 and 26 on equality and non-discrimination, and with Articles 19 and 21 on freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. States parties have both negative obligations to refrain from arbitrary interference and positive obligations to respect, protect, facilitate and guarantee the effective enjoyment of this right.
6. The Committee has clarified in its General Comment No. 29 that derogation measures must be exceptional, strictly necessary and proportionate, and must respect the essence of Covenant rights. States must provide careful justification not only for the decision to proclaim a state of emergency but also for each specific measure adopted under it.
7. Under domestic law, the Turkish Constitution recognises Türkiye as a democratic State governed by the rule of law and guarantees freedom of association. The 1983 Law on the State of Emergency (Law No. 2935) permits, in respect of associations, only the temporary suspension of activities for limited periods and on an individual basis. It does not authorise the permanent dissolution of associations or the confiscation of their assets, nor does it regulate foundations in this respect.[1]
8. Following the attempted coup, the Government ruled primarily through emergency decree-laws (Kanun Hükmünde Kararnameler, KHKs). These measures were based on vague and indeterminate concepts such as “belonging to, having connection with, or contact with” certain structures, and introduced permanent closures and asset confiscations that exceeded the framework set out in the State of Emergency Law, raising serious questions of legality and foreseeability.[2]

III. Systemic Interferences with Freedom of Association under the State of Emergency

9. Immediately after the declaration of the state of emergency in July 2016, Decree-Law No. 667 ordered the liquidation of a wide range of private legal entities alleged to “belong to, be connected to, or have contact with” the Gülen Movement. The entities listed in the annexes included 1,125 associations, 104 foundations, 19 trade unions, 15 universities, 934 private schools and 35 health institutions, with all their assets transferred without compensation to the Treasury or the Directorate General of Foundations.[3]
10. Subsequent decrees (inter alia Nos. 677, 679, 689, 693, 695 and 701) expanded these measures. By early 2018, well over one thousand associations and more than one hundred foundations had been permanently dissolved. In total, 19 trade unions, including two confederations, were also closed. Many of the affected organisations were engaged in human rights, women’s and children’s rights, legal aid, cultural activity, poverty alleviation or professional representation.[4]
11. These closures were not limited to entities directly implicated in the attempted coup or in violence. Organisations were targeted on the basis of alleged organisational, financial or social links, and legal entities were dissolved en masse through lists attached to decree-laws, without prior judicial determination or individualised reasoning.
12. At the same time, the authorities adopted a practice of treating previously lawful associational activities as indicators of criminal liability. Lawful membership of registered associations, foundations and trade unions, donations to organisations later closed by decree, maintaining an account with a lawfully operating bank, sending children to legally authorised schools, or participating in professional and civil society networks were all used as “evidence” of membership of a terrorist organisation in both administrative and criminal proceedings. As highlighted in the ECtHR’s Yalçınkaya judgment, Türkiye’s criminalisation of lawful association and trade-union membership has been found incompatible with Article 11 of the ECHR.[5]
13. In the military sector, an algorithmic profiling system (“FETÖ-Meter”) was implemented. This tool combined multiple criteria, including membership of or donations to associations and foundations later dissolved by decree and relatives’ involvement with these entities, to assign “risk scores” that triggered monitoring, dismissal or criminal investigation. Previously lawful associational ties and family members’ activities were thus converted into factors that led to the loss of employment and other sanctions.[6]
14. In the broader public sector, more than 130,000 public servants, including large numbers of teachers, health workers, judges, prosecutors and civil servants, were dismissed by name through decree-laws. Many of those dismissed were members of trade unions or professional associations, and as a result of the measures were placed under effective lifetime bans from public employment. The cumulative effect was to stigmatise union and association membership and to create a profound chilling effect on the exercise of freedom of association.
15. Access to justice for affected organisations and individuals was severely curtailed. Emergency decrees prohibited courts from granting stays of execution in cases concerning measures taken under those decrees. The Government took the position that decree-laws were “specific legislative transactions” not subject to ordinary judicial review. The Constitutional Court, for its part, interpreted its jurisdiction to preclude abstract review of decree-laws adopted during the state of emergency.[7]
16. The State of Emergency Inquiry Commission, later established as the only avenue to contest dismissals and closures, was largely composed of members appointed by the executive, could not order suspensive measures, relied heavily on secret or inaccessible data, and faced an enormous caseload with very low rates of reinstatement or reopening. It has been widely assessed as failing to provide a timely or effective remedy for the dissolution of associations and other restrictions on freedom of association.[8]

IV. Continuing Restrictions after the End of the State of Emergency

17. Although the state of emergency formally ended in July 2018, many of the emergency measures have been incorporated into ordinary legislation and administrative practice. Decree-law provisions were converted into statute, and new legislation, including Law No. 7262 on the Prevention of the Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,[9] has introduced additional and more permanent constraints on civil society.
18. In particular, Law No. 7262, together with the pre-existing framework of Law No. 6415 on the Prevention of Terrorism Financing, has significantly expanded the State’s asset-freezing powers. These laws enable the executive to designate individuals, associations, foundations and foreign-based civil society organisations for asset-freezing on the basis of broad and opaque criteria, including “reasonable suspicion”, and without prior judicial review. Civil society groups report that these powers have been used to place diaspora-based associations – lawfully established and supervised under the laws of other States – on terrorism-financing lists, thereby severely interfering with their activities.
19. Organisations listed under these mechanisms face serious practical obstacles, including the closure or refusal of bank accounts and an inability to conduct domestic and cross-border financial transactions. In practice, affected organisations and individuals are denied access to the underlying Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) reports and receive only formulaic judicial decisions that systematically uphold the executive measures, leaving them without any effective judicial remedy.
20. Moreover, official asset-freeze lists are automatically replicated by private compliance and “financial intelligence” databases used by banks worldwide, so that those designated by Türkiye are flagged as high-risk and consequently de-banked or denied financial services, even in their countries of residence, creating a form of transnational financial exclusion. For example, humanitarian organisations lawfully registered in EU member States have reported that, after being listed by Türkiye under Laws Nos. 6415 and 7262, they faced account closures and could no longer transfer funds to support their projects, despite never having been the subject of criminal proceedings in their State of registration.
21. In addition to these financial and listing measures, administrative authorities retain the power to suspend association board members who are under investigation or prosecution for broadly defined terrorism-related offences, and to request a court-ordered suspension of activities in similar circumstances. These powers can be exercised even in the absence of convictions, on the basis of mere allegations or ongoing proceedings, and therefore risk being used as instruments of pressure and control over associations.[10]
22. Civil society organisations report frequent, overlapping and detailed inspections by various state bodies, accompanied by the threat of substantial administrative fines. Regulatory amendments have required that all members of associations, not only board members, be recorded in state-managed electronic systems. In the absence of clear safeguards, this raises concerns about privacy and data protection and deters individuals from joining organisations, particularly those working on human rights or sensitive issues.[11]
23. Access to resources has also become a key area of interference. Fundraising is heavily regulated through prior-authorization regimes. Online fundraising campaigns may be blocked or sanctioned. Foreign funding is subject to burdensome notification and documentation requirements, and in certain cases is applied in a selective or discriminatory manner. Risk-based audit schemes developed for anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing purposes have, in practice, stigmatised foreign-funded and rights-based organisations as “high-risk” entities, subjecting them to intensive scrutiny and administrative pressure.
24. These measures have been introduced and implemented in a context where the executive has repeatedly portrayed critical civil society actors as “foreign agents”, “enemies” or threats to national security and public morals, further shrinking civic space and undermining public trust in independent associations and trade unions.[12]

V. Freedom of Association in the Trade Union Sector

25. The trade union sector has been particularly affected by both emergency and ordinary measures. Nineteen trade unions, including two confederations, were closed by decree-laws on allegations of links with terrorist organisations or threats to national security, and their assets were transferred to public bodies. These closures bypassed the ordinary requirement for judicial dissolution under domestic labour legislation.[13]
26. Beyond closures, structural barriers to union organising and collective bargaining remain deeply entrenched. To be recognised as a bargaining agent, a union must meet both a workplace majority requirement and a sector-wide membership threshold. Even after formal reduction, the sectoral threshold continues to exclude many unions in practice, especially newly established and independent ones.[14]
27. Employers frequently challenge unions’ representativity before the courts. Such challenges suspend the authorisation process and may last several years, during which unions cannot bargain or call lawful strikes. Evidence from the field indicates that in the large majority of these cases, employers use the delay to dismiss or intimidate union members and leaders, and that unions lose their representative capacity before the courts finally rule.[15]
28. Protection against anti-union discrimination is insufficient. Legal sanctions are often too weak to deter and do not systematically include reinstatement as a remedy. Many workers, particularly in small enterprises and precarious employment situations, are effectively unprotected against dismissal or other retaliation for union membership or activities.[16]
29. The right to strike is narrowly defined and subject to broad executive interference. Only strikes directly related to a deadlock in collective bargaining are lawful; general, solidarity and many other forms of collective action remain prohibited. The Government may suspend or ban strikes on grounds such as national security, public health, or economic and financial stability, grounds that have been used repeatedly to halt industrial action in key sectors.[17]
30. During and after the state of emergency, numerous strikes – 227 in total, affecting more than 170,000 workers – were postponed or banned, including in sectors such as metal, glass, and banking. Evidence documented by trade unions indicates that many bans were imposed at the behest of employers and justified on broad grounds such as “national security,” revealing patterns of employer–government collusion to prevent industrial action. Trade union demonstrations and labour protests were likewise banned, dispersed, and met with police intervention. Union members and leaders have reported detentions, criminal proceedings, and administrative sanctions in connection with peaceful labour protests, including actions related to working conditions and occupational safety.[18]

VI. Targeted Restrictions and Chilling Effects

31. Human rights defenders, including those working within associations and foundations, have been the targets of criminal investigations, prosecutions and detention. High-profile trials, such as those involving participants in the Gezi Park protests and human rights defenders detained during a training meeting in Büyükada, exemplify the use of terrorism-related charges to criminalise peaceful civic activism.[19]
32. Leaders and members of human rights organisations, including domestic branches of international NGOs and prominent national associations, have faced repeated investigations and trials. Some organisations have been forced to close offices, reduce activities, or engage in self-censorship to mitigate the risk of prosecution or closure.[20]
33. Women’s rights and LGBTI+ organisations have increasingly been subjected to political pressure and delegitimisation. Critical feminist and LGBTI+ groups have been publicly targeted by government officials and pro-government actors, while some have faced administrative obstacles and legal proceedings, including closure cases such as that opened against the We Will Stop Femicides Platform. At the same time, women’s organisations aligned with the executive have gained significantly greater visibility, access and public support, contributing to a highly unequal and polarised civic environment in the field of gender equality.[21]
34. Associations and media outlets operating in the predominantly Kurdish south-east have been particularly affected by closures, curfews, security operations and the broad application of anti-terrorism legislation. Human rights defenders, lawyers and activists in the region have faced harassment, detention and criminal proceedings, which have significantly curtailed the ability of Kurdish and minority communities to exercise freedom of association and to participate in public life.[22]
35. The effects of these policies extend beyond Türkiye’s borders. Diaspora-based associations, solidarity groups and platforms have reported being monitored by Turkish authorities, and individuals who participate in peaceful civic activities abroad have, in some cases, faced terrorism-related investigations or prosecutions in Türkiye on the basis of such participation. This transnational dimension further reinforces the climate of fear surrounding associative life.

VII. Impact of Measures on the State’s Positive Obligations under Article 22

36. In light of the above, it is submitted that the measures adopted and maintained by Türkiye since 2016 are not limited to isolated incidents of interference but amount to a structural reshaping of the associational landscape, with profound implications for the State’s positive obligations under Article 22.
37. Rather than creating an enabling environment in which individuals and groups can freely form, join and operate associations and trade unions, the legal and administrative framework has created a climate of fear and uncertainty. The risk of closure, dismissal, criminalisation, loss of livelihood and social stigmatisation deters people from joining organisations, accepting leadership roles or engaging in advocacy. These chilling effects are not confined to Türkiye. Reports indicate that the authorities closely monitor diaspora-based associations and platforms, and that legitimate participation in such organisations or events abroad has, in some cases, been used as evidence in terrorism-related prosecutions against individuals.
38. The closure of a large number of associations, foundations and trade unions, the criminalisation of lawful membership and support, the retention of emergency-style dismissals and inspections, and the extensive restrictions on access to resources all undermine civil society’s capacity to act as a defender of human rights, a partner in public policy and a channel for democratic participation.
39. This situation runs counter to the Committee’s understanding of freedom of association as a right that not only requires the absence of unjustified interference but also demands that the State take positive measures to facilitate, promote and protect associational life without discrimination.

VIII. Key Findings

40. First, the requirement of legality is not satisfied where restrictions on freedom of association are grounded in vague formulations such as “belonging to, having connection with, or contact with” an ill-defined entity. Such formulations do not provide accessible and foreseeable guidance on prohibited conduct and permit arbitrary enforcement.
41. Second, even where the protection of national security or public order may be invoked as a legitimate aim, the requirements of necessity and proportionality are not met by the permanent dissolution and confiscation of the property of associations, foundations and trade unions on the basis of administrative lists, without prior judicial findings and without consideration of less intrusive measures, such as temporary suspension or targeted sanctions.[23]
42. Third, measures that disproportionately affect particular groups, such as human rights defenders, women’s and LGBTI+ organisations, Kurdish and minority associations, independent trade unions and critical professional bodies, raise concerns under the principles of non-discrimination and equality before the law, especially when pro-government organisations enjoy privileged access to resources and public forums.
43. Fourth, derogations under Article 4 of the ICCPR must be exceptional, time-limited and strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. The breadth, duration and permanence of the measures adopted in Türkiye indicate that emergency powers have been used not only to respond to an immediate threat but also to restructure the civic sphere in ways that outlast the emergency and are incompatible with Article 22.
44. Fifth, the cumulative impact of these measures demonstrates a failure to fulfil the positive obligations inherent in freedom of association, namely to respect, facilitate and guarantee the exercise of this right without discrimination and in full equality before the law.

IX. Recommendations

45. World Human Rights Defenders e.V. respectfully invites the Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment No. 38, to affirm that:

(a) The permanent dissolution of associations, foundations, trade unions and other non-profit entities, and the confiscation of their assets, should be considered an extreme measure compatible with Article 22 only where ordered by an independent and impartial court, following due process, on the basis of precise legal criteria and individualised evidence, and where less restrictive measures would be clearly insufficient.

(b) Restrictions based on vague or indeterminate formulas, including notions of “connection” or “contact” with certain groups, do not meet the standard of legality required by Article 22.

(c) States may not criminalise lawful associational activities, such as membership, donations or participation in the governance of registered organisations, merely because those organisations are later declared unlawful or politically undesirable.

46. The Committee may wish to underline that derogations affecting freedom of association must:

(a) be limited in time and scope;

(b) be strictly required by the exigencies of the situation;

(c) respect the essence of Article 22; and

(d) be subject to effective, prompt and independent judicial review, including access to courts for organisations and individuals whose rights are affected.

47. The Committee is also invited to emphasize that States should:

(a) repeal or substantially amend post-emergency legislation that retains emergency-style powers to dissolve organisations, remove leaders or suspend activities on the sole basis of investigations or broad security allegations.

(b) ensure that risk-based audits and financial-monitoring schemes for anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism purposes do not stigmatise or unduly burden associations and foundations, particularly those receiving foreign funding or working on sensitive issues;

(c) remove structural barriers to trade union organising and collective bargaining, including excessive representativity thresholds, broad strike-ban powers and weak protections against anti-union discrimination; and

(d) guarantee that all workers, including public employees not engaged in the administration of the State, can form and join trade unions of their own choosing and conduct collective bargaining without fear of retaliation.

48. Finally, WHRD encourages the Committee to reiterate that freedom of association entails a positive obligation to foster an enabling environment for civil society. This includes ensuring transparent, non-discriminatory registration procedures; proportionate and non-arbitrary inspections; secure and independent access to domestic and foreign resources; protection from smear campaigns and harassment; and meaningful participation of civil society in law- and policy-making processes.
49. WHRD stands ready to provide any further information or clarification that the Committee may find useful in the preparation of its General Comment.

[1] Venice Commission (2016), Draft Opinion on Emergency Decree Laws in Turkey, pp. 17-20.

[2] Venice Commission (2016), Draft Opinion on Emergency Decree Laws in Turkey, pp. 18-20, 39.

[3] Expert Council on NGO Law (2017), Opinion on the Impact of the State of Emergency on Freedom of Association in Turkey, pp. 17-18.

[4] DİSK (2017), OHAL ve Çalışma Yaşamı: OHAL Emeğe Zararlıdır, pp. 18-19; FES – Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2018) Trade Unions in Turkey, pp. 8-10; İHD – İnsan Hakları Derneği (2017), OHAL KHK’ları Raporu, pp. 20-21; ICJ – International Commission of Jurists (2018), Justice Suspended: Access to Justice and the State of Emergency in Turkey, p. 37-38.

[5] Human Rights Watch (2024), Submission to the Human Rights Committee: Review of Turkey, pp. 3-4.

[6] Algorithmic Persecution in Turkey (2021/2022), FETÖ-Meter / Algorithmic Profiling Report, pp. 10-15.

[7] Expert Council on NGO Law (2017), Opinion on the Impact of the State of Emergency on Freedom of Association in Turkey, pp. 23-26.

[8] Expert Council on NGO Law (2017), Opinion on the Impact of the State of Emergency on Freedom of Association in Turkey, pp. 27-29; ICJ – International Commission of Jurists (2018), Justice Suspended: Access to Justice and the State of Emergency in Turkey, p. 23-25.

[9] See Law No. 7262

[10] ILO CEACR (2023/2024), Observation on Turkey concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (No. 87), pp. 3-4.

[11] TÜSEV (2024), Monitoring Matrix on Enabling Environment for Civil Society 2022–2023, p. 51; STGM – Civil Society Development Center (2023), Civil Society Organisations in Turkey: Freedom of Association, pp. 50-56.

[12] STGM (2022), Outlook of Freedom of Association in Turkey II, pp. 51-56.

[13] DİSK (2017), OHAL ve Çalışma Yaşamı: OHAL Emeğe Zararlıdır, pp. 18-19.

[14] FES – Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2018) Trade Unions in Turkey, pp. 8-10.

[15] TUC – Trades Union Congress (2023), Turkey’s Trade Union Crisis: Repression, Dismissals and Denial of Rights, pp. 4-5.

[16] ILO CEACR (2023/2024), Observation on Turkey concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (No. 87), pp. 4-5.

[17] DİSK (2017), OHAL ve Çalışma Yaşamı: OHAL Emeğe Zararlıdır, pp. 20-22; FES – Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2018) Trade Unions in Turkey, pp. 7-8.

[18] TUC – Trades Union Congress (2023), Turkey’s Trade Union Crisis: Repression, Dismissals and Denial of Rights, p. 6.

[19] Human Rights Watch (2024), Submission to the Human Rights Committee: Review of Turkey, pp. 2-3.

[20] ICJ – International Commission of Jurists (2018), Justice Suspended: Access to Justice and the State of Emergency in Turkey, p. 37-38; U.S. Department of State (2018), Country Human Rights Report: Turkey, pp. 45-46.

[21] OMCT – World Organisation Against Torture (2022), The Legacy of Emergency Decrees in Turkey, pp. 42-43; Ülker Sözen (2022), Civil Society under Siege in Turkey: Authoritarianism, Polarisation and Counterstrategies, pp. 4-5; U.S. Department of State (2018), Country Human Rights Report: Turkey, p. 34.

[22] European Commission (2018), Turkey 2018 Report, p. 18.

[23] Venice Commission (2016), Draft Opinion on Emergency Decree Laws in Turkey, p. 39.